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ABSTRACT
ZHENGQI PAN: Global Value Chains and Production Networks: State-Business Relations and
Complexity in Economic Crises
(Under the direction of Thomas Oatley)
The proliferation of global value chains and production networks (GVCs/GPNs) has significantly
altered the complexion and complexity of international trade. Much research fervor has been
generated to examine the economic organization and spatial dispersion of transnational production,
with particular emphasis on firms. However, politics and the role of the state in GVCs/GPNs are
often neglected. This dissertation thus advances existing research by exploring the political economy
of GVCs/GPNs with states as the focal point. In addition, I base my work largely on the regions of
Northeast and Southeast Asia, given the regions’ strategic state-led developmentalism and meteoric
rise as a global manufacturing hub. I first examine the Asian developmental state model and the
evolution of state-business relations within these states as they move up the value chain using
large-n statistical analysis. I then investigate the dynamics of state-business partnerships through a
comparative case study analysis of eight Asian countries. Finally, I explore the propagation of shocks
in production networks and the role of Asian developmental states during a global economic crisis,
using network analysis and agent-based modeling. Overall, I find that Asian developmental states
moving up the GVC tend to develop tighter linkages with businesses through strategic and aggressive
industrial policies and innovation partnerships. Moreover, in times of crisis, Asian developmental
states help to mitigate the impact of economic shocks through economic policies, strategy and
political will. Consequently, rather than being static, Asian developmental states have been adaptive
to changing global circumstances, tailoring policies to suit their local conditions.
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1 INTRODUCTION
International trade today is primarily characterized by the fragmentation of production processes
and the dispersion of these processes around the world. With improvements in information and
communications technology (ICT), logistics and services, as well as increased liberalization of cross
border transactions since the 1990s and especially in the 2000s, firms are incentivized to relocate
production processes to different countries (UNCTAD (2013)). Given that labor and capital costs are
unevenly distributed across the world, firms also find it profitable and advantageous to participate in
fragmented and dispersed production or supply chains. Previous economic development models that
entail deep and vertical industrialization within the country to spur economic growth are increasingly
abandoned in both developed and developing countries. In other words, countries today seek to join
supply chains1 and no longer aspire to develop their own industries from scratch.
With the emergence and proliferation of global supply chains or GVCs/GPNs, economies are
not merely connected via trade in final products – they are also increasingly connected through trade
in intermediate goods and services required to produce the final product. In fact, statistics from the
OECD in 2013 show that over 50% of the world’s manufacturing imports are intermediate goods
and more than 70% of the world’s services imports are intermediate services.2 Countries are thus
increasingly exporting goods that contain value-added3 imported from abroad. Global supply chains
has thus radically altered the dynamics of international trade, increasing the economic complexity
and interdependence among different economies.
The dynamics of GVCs/GPNs are most evident in the Northeast and Southeast Asian economies,
which have adopted a strategic state-led developmental model and are highly successful in global
supply chain participation and integration (Ferrarini and Hummels (2014)). As Choi and Rhee
(2014) note, the world has witnessed the meteoric rise of Factory Asia, or Asia’s critical role as a
1In general, scholars use the terms global supply chains, global value chains (GVCs), and global production networks
(GPNs) quite interchangeably. But as a guide, this dissertation uses the GVC/GPN framework. An overview of the
GVC/GPN approach is discussed in the next section.
2See OECD (2013b).
3Value-added refers to the contribution to a semi-finished product.
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global manufacturing hub. Factory Asia depicts a set of production networks that connect “factories
in different Asian economies; producing parts and components that are then assembled, with the
final product shipped mainly to advanced economies” (ibid, p.5). Indeed, Factory Asia signify the
phenomenon of “supply in the East, consume in the West” (Ferrarini and Hummels (2014)). A study
of the Asian economies would no doubt increase our understanding of global supply chains.
This three-essays dissertation focuses on two important aspects of GVC/GPN dynamics: (1)
state-business relations in the context of Asian developmental states, and (2) shock propagation
via production networks following an economic crisis. The first and second papers discuss how
state-business relations evolve as Asian developmental states move up the GVC. Notably, paper 1
focuses on changes in state-business industrial policies, while paper 2 examines the evolution of
state-business partnerships. I provide a counterintuitive finding: instead of converging towards the
neoliberal market model, Asian developmental states moving up the GVC will embark on more
strategic and aggressive industrial policies in order to counter the vagaries of market forces and
facilitate the entry of fledging domestic firms into the global economy. Moreover, the developmental
state will engage in more intensive partnerships with businesses as it moves up the GVC in order
to spur innovation. While both papers 1 and 2 focus on domestic dynamics as a consequence of
global economic forces, paper 3 takes on a more macro-level approach and examines complex global
network dynamics as a whole during an economic crisis. I investigate how complex interdependencies
and the bullwhip effect exacerbate the spread of economic crisis in GVCs. Importantly, I look at how
the developmental state can serve as a shock absorber in times of crisis, pointing to the significance
of politics in mitigating economic crises.
This dissertation thus makes two major contributions to current research on GVCs by (1)
developing further insights on Asia’s supply chain governance and institutional structure, and (2)
examining the mechanisms of shock propagation within GVCs during an economic crisis. Importantly,
I emphasize the role of politics and the state in the institutional governance of GVCs, and examine
the complex interplay of domestic and global forces. Methodologically, I use both quantitative and
qualitative research to complement existing studies. Moreover, the use of simulation-based approach
and statistical network analysis in the third paper of my dissertation contributes to the methodological
2
innovations in current research by taking into account complex interactions and interdependencies
within GVCs, as well as complements the large existing qualitative literature on GVCs/GPNs.
1.1 Overview of Global Value Chains and Global Production Networks
Two dominant analytical frameworks exist to conceptualize global supply chains: (1) Global
Value Chains (GVCs), and (2) Global Production Networks (GPNs). The value chain concept was
first used in Porter (1985) and is highly popular in the management science community. But the most
rigorous theorization of GVCs is found in the works of Gary Gereffi, whose GVC framework has a
specific intellectual lineage tied to the world-systems theory developed by Immanuel Wallerstein.4
Broadly, Gereffi defined the value chain as “the full range of activities that firms and workers
perform to bring a product from its conception to end use and beyond” (Gereffi (2014), p.4). Gereffi
(1995) uses four fundamental dimensions to understanding GVCs: (1) an input-output structure,
which describes the process of transforming raw materials into final products, (2) a geographical
consideration, which maps the spatial shifts in global production and industries, (3) a governance
structure, which explains how the value chain is controlled and managed by firms5, and (4) an
institutional context in which the industry value chain is embedded, which describes how local,
national and international conditions and policies shape each stage of the value chain. In addition,
subsequent work by Gereffi and his colleagues explored the concept of upgrading, which is the
“dynamic movement within the value chain by examining how producers shift between different
stages of the chain” (Gereffi and Fernandez-Stark (2011), p.4).
Gereffi’s work focuses on the linear nature of cross border supply chains, noting the value
creation and capture across each progressive stage of the supply chain. Importantly, Gereffi notes
the differential power of firms and their value extraction at various points in the chain (see Gereffi,
Humphrey and Sturgeon (2005)): governance is largely exercised by lead firms in global industries,
constituting power asymmetries between powerful (western) firms and firms in developing countries.
Nonetheless, firms in developing countries still have opportunities for industrial upgrading through
different methods of organization and by moving up the value chain. As such, Gereffi’s GVC concept
4See for instance Gereffi (1994b,a, 1995, 1999b,a, 2003, 2005, 2014) among others.
5Gereffi, Humphrey and Sturgeon (2005) further conceptualized GVC governance into five typologies: (1) market, (2)
modular, (3) relational, (4) captive, and (5) hierarchy, to illustrate the different processes of firm-based GVC framework.
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extends beyond Wallerstein’s static core and periphery world-systems theory to a more dynamic
framework.
Building on the GVC concept, Dickens and his colleagues extended the theorization of global
supply chains to include more actors and placed more emphasis on geospatial network relations (see
Dicken and Malmberg (2001); Dicken, Kelly, Olds and Yeung (2001) and Henderson, Dicken, Hess,
Coe and Yeung (2002)). Their notion of the Global Production Networks or GPNs thus includes
actors beyond the firm such as states, regional and intergovernmental organizations (IGOs), as well
as nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and individuals, and allows scholars to explore more
closely the various institutional contexts in which the value chain is embedded in.6 Moreover, as its
name suggests, the GPN framework hinges on the concept of the network, which reflects the complex
and dynamic interconnectedness and power relations between the diverse set of actors in the global
economy. Importantly, actors in GPNs are embedded in a complex nexus of relations, within global
and local contexts.
Figure 1.1 below shows a heuristic framework to analyze the global economy. Apart from the
diverse network of actors, Figure 1.1 also shows a “complex intermingling of different geographical
scales (global, regional, national and local) in network formation and network processes” (Dicken
et al. (2001), p.95). Indeed, “it becomes meaningless to talk of local versus global processes as in
much of the global-local literature. Instead, we should think in terms of network agents (such as
individuals, firms or states) acting across various distances and through diverse intermediaries” (ibid).
It might thus be useful to think of actors in the global economy as interacting in complex patterns in
a multiscalar and multidimensional latent space.7 While the processes and interactions transcend
boundaries, actors themselves are nonetheless shaped by the geographical territory or institutions
that they are in. Moreover, “actors involved in most commodity chains are typically dissimilar
because they are the products of different institutional environments...even firms operating in highly
internationalized sectors still tend to retain distinct organizational forms and practices that largely
6Depending on the discipline, both GVC and GPN approaches are used quite interchangeably by scholars. I provide an
overview of the GVC and GPN approaches for greater intellectual clarity and to introduce the main works of prominent
scholars.
7This idea is reinforced by Dicken et al. (2001): “we believe that the global economy is constituted by ‘spaces of
network relations’ (p.97).
4
Figure 1.1: GPN Framework (adopted from Dicken (2004))
reflect the regulatory environment of their home country”.8 As such, even though actors may be
transnational, they still carry an ‘institutional baggage’ with them, reflecting a certain path-dependent
developmental trajectory.
8See Whitley (1996) and Dicken et al. (2001) p.96-97
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The discussion on the institutional baggages of firms and path dependency is particularly salient,
and directly points to the significance of national political and economic institutions in shaping
production processes. The various national institutional environments shape how states and firms
interact in a dynamic process, and ultimately constitute and reconstruct the “position of firms, labor
and capital in global production networks, including policies for national economic competitiveness”
(Smith (2014), p.2).
6
2 STATE-BUSINESS RELATIONS IN ASIAN DEVELOPMENTAL STATES
2.1 Introduction
While scholars have recognized the importance of domestic political and economic institutions
in global value chains (GVCs), research on supply chains remains largely firm-centric. The role of
the state and its institutional environment are often overlooked. As such, while the economics of
supply chains receive widespread discussion from management science to urban planning to business
communities, the politics of supply chains are very rarely discussed by scholars.1
Bridging the gap between the discussion on GVCs and the state, this paper uses the develop-
mental state theory to examine Asian state-business relations within global supply chains. The
developmental state model is a form of hybrid capitalism model that combines both neoliberal eco-
nomic characteristics with state-led intervention and industrial policy.2 Following Schmidt (2009),
this paper attempts to put “the ‘political’ back into political economy by bringing the state back in
yet again” (p.516).
Importantly, the increasing complexity of globalization has led some scholars question the
relevance of the developmental state.3 In particular, with the emergence of global supply chains and
lead firms that guide global production, has the developmental state model become redundant? Is
the world witnessing a convergence towards the neoliberal or free market model? Are local firms in
developmental states detaching themselves from the state and gaining more autonomy?
I argue that claims about the demise of the developmental state are unfounded. As Weiss (1999)
notes, the neoliberal claims about the redundancy of the developmental state due to globalization
ignore the adaptability of these states. Rather than a convergence to the neoliberal model, the
developmental state has adapted and evolved according to changing global circumstances, while still
maintaining its grip on the economy. This paper discusses the role of Asian developmental states in
1See Smith (2014), MacDonald (2014), Bair (2005, 2009), Smith, Rainnie, Dunford, Hardy, Hudson and Sadler (2002),
and Leslie and Reimer (1999).
2See Johnson (1982) and Woo-Cumings (1999). I will provide a more thorough review of the developmental state
model in the subsequent section.
3See Beeson (2004), Low (2004), Sato (2013), Pirie (2013) among others.
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global production networks and explores the specific state-business relations in these countries. I
posit that in the face of greater uncertainty and foreign competition following participation in GVCs,
Asian developmental states continue to maintain tight control of trade and investment policies. As
such, far from being autonomous, local firms are still very much tied to the state.
2.2 The Primacy of Politics in Asian Developmental States
First theorized by Chalmers Johnson in his seminal work on Japan’s industrial policy, the devel-
opmental state model or developmental capitalism is a Weberian ideal type of state-led interventionist
economic model that has both neoliberal and socialist elements.4 Compared to the neoliberal and
social-market models, developmental capitalism is much more state-centric and involves the active
role of the state in industrial policy and economic strategy. As such, rather than viewing the state as
a problem, as portrayed in the neoliberal paradigm, the developmental state model emphasizes the
significant role of the state in spearheading economic growth and poverty reduction in society. As
Evans (2013) notes, the model provides a counter framework to the dominant neoliberal narrative
that emphasizes the market as the most important institution that drives economic growth and wel-
fare. Notable examples of developmental states include Japan, South Korea, Singapore and Taiwan,
which are often considered as archetypes of the developmental state, as well as Malaysia, Indonesia,
Thailand, Philippines, Vietnam and (most recently) China.5 Recent literature has also explored the
developmental state beyond the Asian context, looking at African economies such as Botswana.6
The dominant force driving development in these states is politics. Indeed, developmental states
are interested in shoring up economic growth and reducing poverty because political stability rests
on these achievements. Moreover, the political stability of developmental states rests on significant
improvements (or perceived improvements) in the standards of living across a broad segment of
society so as to avoid social unrest and for the ruling elites to stay in power. As Doner, Ritchie
and Slater (2005) note, many developmental states came to being because they faced the threat of
4See Johnson (1982). Also see Wade (1990), Amsden (1989), and Woo-Cumings (1999) for an extensive discussion on
the developmental state.
5See Johnson (1982), Amsden (1989), Wade (1990), Woo-Cumings (1999), Chang (2006), Doner, Ritchie and Slater
(2005), Hayashi (2010), Howell (2006), and Jian-xing and De-jin (2010).
6Botswana is often held up as an example of a developmental state in Africa. Some scholars and policymakers have
been increasing interested in looking at the applicability of the developmental state model in other parts of Africa such as
Ethiopia and South Africa. For a more thorough discussion on African developmental states, see Sandbrook, Edelman,
Heller and Teichman (2007), Kellsal and Booth (2010), Meyns and Musamba (2010), and Edigheji (2011).
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internal unrest, and thus, one of the key aims of the developmental state was to develop a workable
strategy that involves economic growth in order to quell domestic unrest. In addition, the authors
posit a set of factors for the developmental state to emerge, namely, (1) a credible internal threat,
(2) geopolitical insecurities, and (3) scarcity of natural resources. Indeed, the developmental state
focuses on broad-based economic development and growth due to political and economic exigencies.
A pragmatic view of political stability is the prime motivation of economic development in the
developmental state.
Given the primacy of politics in the developmental state literature, Vu (2007) notes two key
aspects of developmental states that go hand in hand: (1) state capacity, and (2) political will7. Indeed,
a state that possesses strong institutional capacity may still not be classified as ‘developmental’ if it
lacks the leadership or political will to carry out developmental goals, which refer to the attainment of
high economic growth rates, widespread increases in standard of living and broad-based legitimacy
(Routley (2012), p.7). Conversely, a state that possesses the political will to carry out developmental
reforms but lacks the capacity to do so will also not become a developmental state. To further
operationalize the concept of the developmental state, I draw from Routley (2012) and a variety
of the readings in the developmental state literature. The attributes of the developmental state
can be summarized as having: (1) a political leadership that is oriented towards the economic
development of the country8, (2) a meritocratic and autonomous9 bureaucracy that is connected to
or embedded in business communities10, and (3) active policy interventions to help promote and
sustain economic growth11. Consequently, developmental states are commonly characterized by the
7Political will in this case is narrowly defined as the determination of political leaders to carry out developmental
goals. Some countries lack the political will to carry out developmental policies and prey on society through rent-seeking
operations. Notable examples include Zaire under Mobutu and Cameroon under Biya. For a more thorough discussion, see
Evans (1995).
8See for instance Fritz and Menocal (2007), Vu (2007), and Musamba (2010).
9Generally free from political influence in the country. Even in authoritarian regimes, the bureaucracy is able to exercise
considerable autonomy in economic policies. In Johnson’s words, “politicians reign and the state bureaucrats rule” in
developmental states (Johnson (1981)).
10Evans (1995).
11See Johnson (1982), Wade (1990), Amsden (1989), and Woo-Cumings (1999). Notably even with active industrial
policy, developmental states may not experience high growth rates in the event of a global or regional economic crisis
such as the Asian Financial Crisis of 1998. Nonetheless, a key characteristic of the development state is the deliberate and
active intervention of states in the economy regardless of whether or not an economic crisis exists. This is in stark contrast
with the neoliberal model.
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deliberate, close, and often mutually beneficial symbiotic relationship between state agencies and
business communities.
2.3 The Developmental State Model: Redundancy or Reconfiguration?
For much of the past three decades, economic globalization has progressed hand-in-hand with
the dominant theory of neoliberalism, which advocates unfettered markets and the minimal role
of the state (Hayek (1973), and Rothbard (2004)).12 To proponents of neoliberal economics, free
markets and free trade will unleash the creative and entrepreneurial spirit of individuals, leading to
individual liberty and well-being, as well as the efficient allocation of scarce resources. The state,
on the other hand, does not possess sufficient information to “second-guess market signals (prices)”
and is prone to be captured by particularistic interests that will “inevitably distort and bias state
interventions” (Harvey (2005), p.2). Neoliberal economists thus view states with skepticism and
they view state intervention in the economy via active industrial policy with disdain. Consequently,
the developmental state model is often seen as incompatible with the competitive pressures of
economic globalization (Baker, Epstein and Pollin (1998), Kozul-Wright and Rowthorn (1998)).
As Weiss (2003) notes, states seem to be increasingly threatened by capital mobility from below
and intergovernmental organizations such as the World Trade Organization (WTO) from above, and
their “traditional hold over economic actors has diminished, their control of the domestic economy
has eroded, and their room for maneuver in the policy arena has been reduced to the margins”
(p.245). In addition, some critics argue that the Asian financial crisis in 1997 was “the result of the
malfunctioning of the Asian developmental states in the age of globalization” (Frankel (2000) and
Yellen (1998)).13
With increasing fragmentation of world trade and global production, the dominance of the
developmental state over the economy seems to be even more bleak. Yeung (2014) asserts that as
local firms in developmental states become more embedded in global production networks, these
firms will be increasingly tied to global lead firms and gradually detach themselves from the state.
12For more discussion see Harvey (2005), and Friedman (1980). In particular, Harvey (2005) attempts to provide a
comprehensive definition of neoliberalism by defining it as, “a theory of political economic practices that proposes that
human well-being can best be advanced by liberating individual entrepreneurial freedoms with skills within an institutional
framework characterized by strong private property rights, free markets and free trade. The role of the state is to create and
preserve an institutional framework appropriate to such practices...Furthermore, if markets do not exist (in areas such as
land, water, education, health care, social security- or environmental pollution) then they must be created, by state action if
necessary. But beyond these tasks the state should not venture” (p.2).
13Also see Shin (2005) for a discussion on the role of the state in the age of globalization.
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Yeung develops the concept of ‘strategic coupling’ to advance a firm-centric model of economic
transformation and industrialization in East Asian economies. For Yeung, the notion of ‘strategic
coupling’ involves the “dynamic processes through which national firms decouple partially or
completely from their domestic political-economic structures – developmental states or otherwise –
over time and re-couple with lead firms in global production networks” (p.3). Importantly, he posits
that the developmental state’s ability to manage industrial transformation through direct industrial
policy will become increasingly “difficult and problematic” due to deepening linkages between local
firms and global lead firms that drive global production networks (Yeung (2014), p.4). For Yeung,
inter-firm dynamics play an increasingly critical role in driving GPNs.
Quite similarly, Wong (2011a) notes that state-led development in advanced Asian economies
such as South Korea, Taiwan and Singapore is no longer tenable in the phase of science-based
high-tech industrialization. He posits that these hi-tech industries pose great uncertainty in terms
of (1) technological research, which does not always yield the expected results, (2) economic
returns, which may not be profitable after all due to uncertainty in the economic valuation of new
science applications, and (3) the length of time taken to achieve performance and results (Wong
(2011a)). Indeed, as advanced developmental states move into the hi-tech value chain, they will face
multiple challenges in managing their industries and achieving phenomenal growth rates. Wong’s
central argument is that developmental states that are engaged in innovation processes can no longer
micro-manage and intervene directly in the economy due to the lack of information and high degree
of uncertainty, and must thus (inevitably) cede control to firms and let market mechanisms play
out efficiently. Indeed, systemic factors such as the nature of the hi-tech global value chain and
transnational inter-firm dynamics may force the state to take a secondary role in the industrialization
process.
While the developmental state model seems in danger of becoming obsolete, scholars such as
Linda Weiss and Christopher Dent argue that critics have overlooked the adaptability of developmen-
tal states to new global circumstances. Proponents of the developmental state model assert that rather
than being static and rigid, the developmental state is constantly learning and adapting to the external
and internal environment, such that its management strategies change and evolve over time. Drawing
insights from two in-depth case studies on South Korea and Taiwan, Weiss (2003) notes that the
“increased exposure to global markets makes the state’s infrastructural and coordinating role more,
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not less, important” (p.267). For instance, the South Korean government created new initiatives
to finance high-tech start-ups and created a new state-backed software retail market to support the
Korean software industry in the late 1990s and early 2000s. According to Weiss, local producers in
the software industry also welcomed close collaboration with the Korean government as piracy was
rife and firms needed the state to regulate the consumer market. Local firms also benefitted from
close private-public partnerships when the state organized a consortium of thirty-seven companies,
the Software Infra Network of Korea (SOFRANO), to enable firms establish close contacts with other
firms and engage in synergistic development (Weiss (2003), p.258). Moreover, when local firms face
fierce competition from abroad, they may “end up inviting, rather than rejecting, state involvement in
a shared transformative project” (ibid). Indeed, the developmental intent behind Taiwan’s Financial
Merger and Acquisition law was to “promote national firms capable of withstanding competition
from foreign firms in banking, insurance, and securities” (Weiss (2003), p.266). For Weiss, the
state is in a process of adaptive rather than transformative institutional change. Local firms are not
given free reign in their business networks, but rather, are being encouraged and facilitated by the
developmental state.
Dent (2007) argues that developmental states have not become extinct, but rather have evolved
within the complexity of the global economy. He notes that “while the policy tools and means may
have changed, developmental states still preside over various adaptive-cum-transformative economic
projects that increasingly involve a partnering with transnationalized capital” (p. 227). Importantly,
he asserts that developmental states are highly adaptive because of their inherent characteristics, such
as having strong technocratic capabilities for strategic planning and market intelligence, as well as
having close and established networks with domestic and foreign businesses (ibid). His case analysis
of Singapore, South Korea and Taiwan shows that the workings of developmental states are still
very much evident in these countries. The author notes that even in the case of South Korea, where
attempts have been made to decouple the state-chaebol14 nexus, the path dependent interlocking
nature of both the state and the chaebols made decoupling very difficult. Dent (2007) remarked that
the developmental state’s “embeddedness within the domestic political economy is not so easily
eradicated” (p.239).
14Chaebols refer to domestic big business groups in South Korea.
12
In another more recent paper, Lee, Heo and Kim (2014) note that the South Korean government
was instrumental in the creation of newly-emerging high-tech clusters, giving birth to Korea’s
successful liquid crystal display (LCD) industry. Moreover, the state was a critical player in the
coupling process between local firms and global lead firms, acting as the role of coordinator and
mediator of conflicts. Consequently, strategic coupling cannot occur without the auspices of the state,
and the developmental state with its institutional capacity and political will is aptly positioned to
facilitate such a process.
Perhaps the more interesting question is not whether Asian developmental states still exist (or if
they are still important), but rather, how and why they have changed with time. Importantly, Asian
economies have neither converged to the neoliberal model nor have they remained the same as before
(Yeung (2007), and Kyung-Sup, Fine and Weiss (2012)). Even scholars who emphasize a firm-centric
argument still recognize some core characteristics of the developmental state in Asia (Yeung (2014),
and Wong (2011a)). For instance, Yeung (2014) wrote that his argument for the evolution of East
Asian state-firm relationships “does not imply a zero-sum relationship in which state power declines
because of the rise of national-firms”, but rather, the state is no longer the dominant player in complex
production networks (p.5).
2.3.1 Evolution of Developmental States Following Participation in GVCs
While studies have tried to explain the adaptability of developmental states and how these states
influence businesses, the evolution process itself has not been adequately accounted for.15 Most
of these processes seem to be influenced by the abstract and complex forces of ‘globalization’. I
argue that in order to better understand the evolution of state-business relations, we need to examine
changes in the country’s position along the global value chain.16 I assess state-business relations by
looking at: (1) the degree of intrusiveness of the state on businesses through economic policy, such
as price controls and investment restrictions17, and (2) the number of state-business partnerships.
A country’s position in the global value chain determines its state-business relations. Wong
(2011a) argues that as developmental states climb higher up the value chain and venture into
15See for instance Weiss (1999, 2003, 2012), Weiss and Hobson (2000) and Dent (2005, 2007). Also see the collection
of articles in Fine, Saraswati and Travasci (2013), and Kyung-Sup, Fine and Weiss (2012).
16Notably, some countries may switch value chains (e.g. from medium to high tech chains) but the analysis is similar to
that of moving up the value chain.
17A more elaborate operationalization will be provided in the data section below.
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innovation processes, they are less likely to micro-manage the economy and restrict businesses
due to great difficulties in doing so arising from technical and information uncertainty. However,
this argument underestimates the political will of developmental states to conduct active industrial
policies and overlooks the possibility that developmental states may still be eager to manage the
economy even in the face of great uncertainty and difficulties. Indeed, increasing challenges do not
necessarily deter developmental states from active industrial policies. After all, the primary objective
of the developmental state is to maintain political and social order through economic growth and
prosperity. Taking a hands-off approach after decades of developmentalism may create unnecessary
shocks in the economy, thereby hurting domestic producers. This may in turn upset the political
stability within the country and undermine the state’s power. Moreover, even though the prospect
of gradual reforms may be tempting, developmental states may not be willing to liberalize much
given that economic growth is so critical to regime stability. Since participation in GVCs entail
exposing the country to greater market forces and uncertainty, the state may choose to further tighten
the management of its economy, rather than subject the economy to the vagaries of the market. As
such, rather than neoliberal reforms, the developmental state may adopt more aggressive industrial
policies as it moves up the value chain in order to overcome new challenges and maintain economic
and political stability.
In addition, as states move into research and innovative processes, high barriers to entry make it
difficult for fledging domestic firms to enter the global market. Consequently, the developmental
state needs to step in to support and protect local firms. Local firms can then better survive through
incentives and help from the state. Thus, state support is critical to ensure that local firms have a
chance to enter the market in the first place. Notably, state support for local firms occur at every
stage of the value chain, but this support may be more critical and substantial as the state moves
higher up the chain due to increasingly high barriers to entry.
Importantly, due to their focus on nurturing niche or champion industries, developmental states
are likely to impose restrictions on capital flows and foreign ownership of companies. Investments
are likely to be channeled to particular ‘niche’ sectors to drive growth in those industries. Moreover,
as the developmental state moves up the value chain, the choices of champion industries are likely to
shrink due to high technical barriers to entry. Consequently, developmental states high on the value
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chain may impose more restrictive investment policies that reflect the states’ priority of cultivating
champion industries. I thus develop the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 1: The higher the developmental state is on the GVC, the more intrusive its economic
policies will be.
Besides economic restrictions, developmental states also rely on positive inducements such
collaborative partnerships with MNCs to drive and sustain growth. Following participation in GVCs,
developmental states need to leverage the technical expertise and reputation of global lead firms to
advance their domestic industries. As such, developmental states often form partnerships with global
MNCs for technical diffusion to occur.18 Industrial parks catered to particular sectors may be set
up to induce MNCs to invest in the country. The industrial parks provide opportunities for local
firms and global MNCs to interact and exchange information, linking local firms with prestigious
multinational brands. Indeed, local-global business partnerships allow for synergistic development
and enable local firms to leapfrog into the global market. Notably, as developmental states move
higher up the GVC, they will require more partnerships with MNCs due to the need for greater
technical and knowledge diffusion.
Hypothesis 2: The higher the developmental state is on the GVC, the more partnerships it will
forge with global MNCs.
From the discussion above, local firms are still very much tied to the state. While local firms
may have increased their linkages with global MNCs, they are still highly bounded by local state
policies. Moreover, as Lee, Heo and Kim (2014) note, strategic coupling between local and global
firms cannot occur without the auspices of the state. Importantly, the state is also a critical player
in conflict resolution and mediation between local and global firms. Thus, one can view Asia’s
state-business relation as ‘tripartite’ in nature, as an ‘iron triangle’ constituting local firms, MNCs,
and developmental states in production networks.
2.4 Data and Methods
My dependent variables are (1) intrusiveness of state-business policy, and (2) number of collabo-
rative state-business partnerships. The data cover the years 2000 to 2011 and include 94 countries
worldwide for each year. Countries beyond Asia are included in the full dataset to ensure greater
18See for example Dent (2007) and Weiss (2003).
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generalizability and validity of results. Data used to measure the intrusiveness of state-business policy
are drawn from the 2012 Economic Freedom of the World (EFW) Data by the Fraser Institute. This
dataset represents a credible source of economic freedom data, and is used widely in peer-reviewed
academic journals such as Academy of Management Journal,World Development, Kyklos, and Public
Choice, to name a few.19 By having several disaggregated indicators, the EFW dataset provides a
nuanced way of measuring economic freedom. In particular, I will pay attention to the following
indicators, which are directly relevant to this paper: (1) transfers and subsidies, (2) tariffs and non-
tariff barriers, (3) foreign ownership investment and restrictions, (4) capital controls, (5) licensing
restrictions, and (6) government enterprise and investment. The data is based on a 10-point scale
(interval variables) and I have transformed the data by multiplying it by -1, such that the higher the
score of a particular component, say transfers and subsidies, the worse a country has fared in terms of
economic freedom.20 Six separate regressions are thus run to assess the importance of developmental
states in affecting each of these indicators. Lastly, data for state-business partnerships are obtained
from the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization’s (UNESCO) Institute for
Statistics, which shows the percentage of manufacturing firms that cooperated with the government
and public research institutes.
My main independent variable is the interaction term Developmental State x Position on the
GVC, which comprise the variables Developmental State and Position on the GVC. Developmental
State is a binary variable with ‘0’ representing countries that are not developmental states, ‘1’
representing the developmental states of Northeast and Southeast Asia, such as Japan, South Korea,
Singapore, Taiwan, Malaysia, Indonesia, Thailand, Vietnam and the Philippines. Position on the
GVC is calculated using a country’s domestic value-added exports divided by its gross exports. Thus,
a country with high domestic value-add as a percentage of gross exports is said to be positioned
high up on the chain or is primarily engaged in a high-tech value chain for exports. Data to measure
19For a full list of peer-reviewed journals published using the EFW dataset since 1994, see http://www.
freetheworld.com/papers.html (Last assessed: 22 April 2015).
20Originally, the reverse is true: a score of 10 represents the maximum freedom rating for a component, while a 1
represents the worst freedom rating. I transformed the data to make the results more intuitive for interpretation in my
regression analysis.
16
domestic value-add as a percentage of gross exports are obtained from United Nations Conference
on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) GVC-EORA database.21
My control variables include (1) Bribes, Payments, and Favoritism, which represents corruption,
(2) Polity, which is the democracy score of a country, (3)FDI as a percentage of GDP, which
measures the stakes and extent of foreign MNC involvement in the country, (4)Centralized Collective
Bargaining, which measures the power of labor unions in the country, (5)Percentage of R&D Financed
by the Government, which represents the gross domestic expenditure on research and development
financed by the government, and (6)Tertiary Education Expenditure by the Government, which is the
tertiary education expenditure as a percentage of total government education expenditure.22 Data
for Polity are obtained from the Polity IV project, and data for FDI as a percentage of GDP are
obtained from UNCTAD. Data for Percentage of R&D Financed by the Government, and Tertiary
Education Expenditure by the Government are both obtained from UNESCO’s Institute of Statistics.
The rest of the data are obtained from the EFW dataset. In addition, the variables FDI as a percentage
of GDP, Percentage of R&D Financed by the Government, and Tertiary Education Expenditure
by the Government, have continuous values greater than 0 but less than 100, while Polity is an
ordinal variable ranging from -10 to 10. Bribes, Payments, and Favoritism and Centralized Collective
Bargaining are interval variables on a 10-point scale.
2.4.1 Multiple Imputation
Like the vast majority of statistical analyses, the dataset for this paper contains missing values.
Most statistical software only considers complete cases in their statistical analysis, and casually
deletes the missing rows from the data in a process known as casewise deletion. Casewise deletion
omits cases that might yield important results and are likely to bias our statistical analysis. Another
method that is increasingly popular and more accurate is known as multiple imputation, which is a
procedure to fill in a set of plausible values that reflect the uncertainty about the correct value for each
of the missing case. The set of imputed datasets are subsequently analyzed using standard statistical
techniques and the results are combined using strategies described in Rubin (1987). Multiple
imputation is desirable because it helps to reduce bias and obtain fairly accurate estimates of the
21I would like to specially thank Mr Masataka Fujita, Head of Investment Trend and Issues Branch, UNCTAD for kindly
sharing the UNCTAD dataset with me.
22Controls 5 and 6 are catered to hypothesis 2 of the paper.
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standard errors and t-scores. Moreover, multiple imputation is robust to departures from normality
assumptions and provides adequate results in the presence of low sample size or high rates of
missing data. For my dataset on the intrusiveness of business policy, I have approximately 21.54%
missingness, which is considered a moderate level of missingness. On the other hand, my dataset
on state-business partnerships has very high degree of missingness, with the year 2010 containing
the least missingness (at 65.96% missingness) and some years containing complete missingness for
the variable on state-business partnerships. Rather than deleting all the missing cases, I impute the
datasets and conduct my regression analysis for the pooled datasets and also specifically for the year
2010 as a further robustness check.23
The main assumption is that the missing data are Missing at Random (MAR), which is the
case when missingness of one variable can be related to other variables. This is in contrast with
data that are Missing Completely at Random (MCAR) or Non-Ignorable (NI). As noted by Gelman
and Hill (2007), MCAR is very rare in social phenomena because it assumes that no underlying
association process exists to cause the absence of the data. NI occurs when missingness is related to
unknown and unobserved parameters, and is not likely in my data as all the missing values contain at
least one neighborhood observation. In addition, given that the missing data are mainly related to
sensitive issues such as government economic policies and state-business partnership information,
companies and the government may be reluctant to provide such information in surveys. In the case
of state-business partnerships, businesses may be more comfortable with providing just their research
and development expenditure data rather precise data on state-business cooperation. The inclusion of
more predictors in the model can thus mitigate the censoring mechanisms and bring the data closer
to what is described as MAR (Gelman and Hill (2007)). As such, the assumption of MAR fits my
dataset the best.
2.4.2 Fixed Time Effects (Least Squares Dummy Variable Approach)
Many studies in political science ignore heterogeneity across time by running a straightforward
ordinary least squares (OLS) or logistic regression on time-series cross-sectional (TSCS) data, which
are data that consist of “repeated observations on a series of fixed units” (Beck (2001)). This crude
23Time-series multiple imputation is conducted using the Amelia II package in R (see Honaker and King (2010)). I have
used m=10 imputations, which is considered to be robust by common standards. Applications with very high degrees of
missing data require just 5 to 10 imputations to achieve high reliability (see Rubin (1987)).
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aggregation will lead to bias estimates and inaccurate analysis. Recognizing time heterogeneity,
I will use the Fixed Time Effects model with Least Squares Dummy Variable (LSDV) approach
in my paper, which controls for time effects but considers unit heterogeneity in the model. This
model is well-suited for my research, given that my main aim is to explore the effects of various
developmental states on government economic policies and collaboration. Mathematically, the fixed
time effects with LSDV has the same mechanism as the general OLS, except that it controls variation
across time by incorporating time dummy variables24. The equation below presents the general form
of the fixed time effects with LSDV:
Yi = ✓ +
2011X
t=2001
↵t⌧t +  1Xi + µi, (2.1)
where:
• Yi is the dependent variable
• ✓ is the base year intercept of the model, which is year 2000 in this case
• ↵t is a coefficient estimate for each time dummy variable apart from the base year
• ⌧t is a time dummy variable
• Xi is an independent variable
•  1 is the coefficient estimate of Xi
• µi is the error term
To ensure greater robustness of the results, I implement panel-corrected standard errors (PCSE)
in my models. As noted in the seminar paper by Beck and Katz (1995), TSCS data are often
plagued with non-spherical errors due to unit level heteroskedasity and contemporaneous correlation
across units. Cross-sectional heteroskedasity will yield inconsistent OLS standard errors, and
contemporaneous correlation of errors across units will result in inefficient coefficient estimates and
24An alternative (but almost identical) way is to model it using fixed effects with the within-time approach. However,
this modeling technique suppresses the intercept and time-invariant variables (such as the developmental state variable in
this paper), resulting in inaccurate R2 and adjusted R2 statistics. I thus use the least squares dummy variable approach
instead, which yields similar results for the coefficient estimates but has more accurate test statistics.
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biased standard errors. As such, in order to correct these issues and to allow better inference of my
models, I use panel-corrected standard errors.
2.5 Results and Analysis
The results in tables 3.1 and 2.2 (see below) point to the statistical significance of the main
predictor: Developmental State x GVC Position. Overall, the results support hypothesis 1 of this
paper by showing that the higher a developmental state is on the global value chain, the more intrusive
its industrial policies. The coefficient estimate of the main predictor is positive and statistically robust
at the 0.05 level in four of the six models with the following dependent variables: (1) Transfers and
subsidies, (2) Tariff and non-tariff barriers, (3) Foreign ownership and investment restrictions, and
(4) Capital controls.25 The other two models with dependent variables Licensing Restrictions and
Government Enterprise and Investment do not show statistical significance of the main predictor.
None of the models has a negative and statistically significant interaction term, meaning that no
results were found to be in conflict with hypothesis 1. Notably, the interpretation of just the individual
terms in the interaction may be incomplete or misleading as one term is conditioned upon the other.
In addition, the predicted and marginal effects plots (with 95% confidence bands) provide a
greater robustness check and shows how the interaction term is empirically salient (see figures
3.1-2.4). From the plots, we see that the predicted effects of GVC position on various industrial
policies26 for developmental states are all positive and much more impactful compared to non-
developmental states, as characterized by larger slopes of the developmental state. In fact, for figure
3.1, non-developmental states have an inverse relationship between GVC position and predicted
values of transfers and subsidies, while developmental states exhibit a positive relationship in lieu
with hypothesis 1. The positive relationship also holds true for all the marginal effects plots that
show the marginal effect of the developmental state on various industrial policies across the range
of possible GVC positions. Consequently, developmental states encourage greater use of industrial
policies as these states move higher up the value chain.27
25These variables are also the most commonly cited within the developmental state literature.
26These are the dependent variables as mentioned above. The plots show in greater detail the relationship between the
significant interaction terms and their respective dependent variables. To be clear, the dotted line represents developmental
states, while the solid line represents non-developmental states.
27A straightforward substantive interpretation of the coefficient estimates is not possible given the various mathematical
transformations involved in the calculation of the dependent variable indices, which are based on the Economic Freedom
of the World (EFW) scores on a 10-point scale. In addition, given that the main predictor is the interaction term which is
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For the control variables, corruption (Bribes, Payments and Favoritism) is statistically significant
and positive for all but one of the models in tables 1 and 2.28, which means that the higher the
level of corruption, the more intrusive the business policies (except transfers and subsidies) of a
country. A possible explanation for the anomaly in the transfers and subsidies model is that official
government transfers and subsidies have manifested in the form of illegal and underhand monetary
transfers, bribes and payments, thereby decreasing the need for outright monetary transfers. For
the case of Centralized Collective Bargaining, it is positively correlated with intrusiveness business
policies and is statistically significant for five of the six models, indicating that the more powerful
the labor unions, the more restrictive the economy will be as governments seek to protect the local
workforce from foreign competitors. Centralized Collective Bargaining is not statistically significant
for model 3 (“Foreign Ownership Investment and Restrictions”). For FDI as a Percentage of GDP,
the results are only statistically significant and negative for three of the six models29, showing that
as MNC investment in the domestic economy increases, the government will be less willing to
implement intrusive business policies as these policies may hinder investors and hurt the economy.
Polity is a proxy for democracy and has a negative and statistically significant coefficient for five
of the six models. Interestingly, Polity is positive and statistically significant for the transfer and
subsidies model, implying that as a country becomes more democratic, it is likely to increase transfers
and subsidies in the economy. Examples can be seen in the US and the European Union, where
agricultural subsidies are rife. In addition, given that mature democracies are usually affluent societies,
transfers and subsidies may also be used in high-tech industries such as Boeing and Dow Chemical in
the US to moderate costs and encourage innovation under high degrees of technological uncertainty.
For other intrusive business policies Polity has a dampening effect, meaning that democracies are
more likely to demolish trade barriers and engage in free trade in general. For Position on GVC, it is
a statistical control used to create the interaction term in question.30
conditioned by both Position on GVC and Developmental State, interaction term plots present more nuanced relationships
on predicted values and marginal effects, and are thus more effective than the direct interpretation of the coefficient
estimates.
28Results for hypothesis 2 will be discussed later in this section.
29These are models 2 (“Tariff and Non-Tariff Barriers”), 3 (“Foreign Ownership Investment and Restrictions”) and 4
(“Capital Controls”). The rest of the models are not statistically significant.
30Note that the intercept, which represents the base year dummy variable (year 2000), as well as the other year dummy
variables are not of interest in this paper as they act as controls for the time dynamic in the dataset.
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Table 2.1: Fixed Time Effects Regression Results
Dependent variables:
(1) (2) (3)
Transfers Tariff Foreign Ownership
& Subsidies & Non-Tariff Barriers & Investment Restrictions
Developmental State -9.436⇤ -1.809⇤ -1.217⇤
(0.486) (0.342) (0.283)
Position on GVC -5.951⇤ 3.179⇤ 1.264⇤
(0.291) (0.341) (0.303)
Developmental State 11.838⇤ 3.038⇤ 1.899⇤
x Position on GVC (0.654) (0.481) (0.491)
Centralized Collective Bargaining 0.174⇤ 0.146⇤ 0.012
(0.030) (0.029) (0.033)
Bribes, Payments and Favoritism -0.360⇤ 0.683⇤ 0.316⇤
(0.022) (0.075) (0.025)
Polity 0.038⇤ -0.073⇤ -0.035⇤
(0.011) (0.011) (0.011)
FDI as Percentage of GDP -0.002 -0.027⇤ -0.013⇤
(0.005) (0.007) (0.005)
Intercept (Base Year=2000) -3.957⇤ -10.359⇤ -6.507⇤
(0.448) (0.626) (0.389)
Year 2001 0.031 -0.072 -0.010
(0.031) (0.046) (0.035)
Year 2002 -0.013 -0.078 1.101⇤
(0.029) (0.050) (0.048)
Year 2003 -0.038 0.101 1.162⇤
(0.026) (0.058) (0.044)
Year 2004 -0.033 -0.114 1.029⇤
(0.027) (0.071) (0.038)
Year 2005 -0.242⇤ 0.430⇤ 1.172⇤
(0.033) (0.069) (0.048)
Year 2006 -0.133⇤ 0.282⇤ 1.066⇤
(0.0370) (0.073) (0.050)
Year 2007 -0.084 -0.078 0.964⇤
(0.044) (0.096) (0.064)
Year 2008 0.137⇤ -0.009 1.506⇤
(0.043) (0.099) (0.053)
Year 2009 0.392⇤ -0.231⇤ 1.638⇤
(0.053) (0.096) (0.062)
Year 2010 0.359⇤ -0.277⇤ 1.514⇤
(0.056) (0.116) (0.060)
Year 2011 0.273⇤ 0.034 1.564⇤
(0.055) (0.113) (0.058)
Observations 1128 1128 1128
R2 0.500 0.532 0.492
Adjusted R2 0.493 0.525 0.483
p-value of F Statistic < 2.2e-16⇤ < 2.2e-16⇤ < 2.2e-16⇤
Note: Panel Corrected Standard Errors ⇤p<0.05
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Table 2.2: Fixed Time Effects Regression Results (Continued)
Dependent variables:
(4) (5) (6)
Capital Controls Licensing Restrictions Government
Enterprise
Developmental State -0.533 -2.026⇤ 1.079
(0.833) (0.736) (0.566)
Position on GVC 1.370⇤ -0.074 2.443⇤
(0.444) (0.450) (0.774)
Developmental State x Position on GVC 2.931⇤ 2.354 -0.370
(1.155) (1.307) (0.783)
Centralized Collective Bargaining 0.220⇤ 0.101⇤ 0.218⇤
(0.054) (0.031) (0.043)
Bribes, Payments and Favoritism 0.470⇤ 0.535⇤ 0.501⇤
(0.045) (0.071) (0.054)
Polity -0.167⇤ -0.041⇤ -0.084⇤
(0.012) (0.019) (0.015)
FDI as Percentage of GDP -0.032⇤ 0.000 0.004
(0.012) (0.007) (0.011)
Intercept (Base Year=2000) 0.144 -1.723⇤ -2.452⇤
(0.496) (0.741) (0.837)
Year 2001 -0.221⇤ -0.214⇤ -0.240⇤
(0.049) (0.072) (0.081)
Year 2002 -0.367⇤ -0.384⇤ -0.214⇤
(0.056) (0.093) (0.074)
Year 2003 -0.474⇤ -0.421⇤ -1.082⇤
(0.046) (0.086) (0.069)
Year 2004 -0.456⇤ -0.911⇤ -1.152⇤
(0.082) (0.147) (0.075)
Year 2005 0.205⇤ -0.782⇤ -1.384⇤
(0.077) (0.119) (0.119)
Year 2006 0.148⇤ -0.941⇤ -1.531⇤
(0.073) (0.140) (0.114)
Year 2007 0.018 -1.260⇤ -1.438⇤
(0.090) (0.147) (0.120)
Year 2008 -0.021 -1.50⇤ -1.372⇤
(0.104) (0.163) (0.128)
Year 2009 0.191 -1.547⇤ -1.011⇤
(0.114) (0.157) (0.118)
Year 2010 0.128 -2.092⇤ -1.188⇤
(0.120) (0.167) (0.143)
Year 2011 0.152 -2.23⇤ -1.357⇤
(0.119) (0.170) (0.143)
Observations 1128 1128 1128
R2 0.316 0.307 0.221
Adjusted R2 0.305 0.295 0.209
p-value of F Statistic < 2.2e-16⇤ < 2.2e-16⇤ < 2.2e-16⇤
Note: Panel Corrected Standard Errors ⇤p<0.05
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Figure 2.1: Predicted and Marginal Effects Plots (Transfer and Subsidies)
(a)
(b)
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Figure 2.2: Predicted and Marginal Effects Plots (Tariff & Non-Tariff Barriers)
(a)
(b)
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Figure 2.3: Predicted and Marginal Effects Plots (Foreign Ownership Investment & Restrictions)
(a)
(b)
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Figure 2.4: Predicted and Marginal Effects Plots (Capital Controls)
(a)
(b)
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Table 2.3: Fixed Time Effects and Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) Regression Results
Dependent variable:
(7) (8)
State-Business Cooperation
Developmental State 9.897 14.616
(6.951) (12.256)
Position on GVC 2.372 8.128
(1.731) (5.332)
Developmental State x Position on GVC -10.938 -16.122
(9.163) (18.797)
Percentage of R&D financed by Government -0.034 -0.044
(0.036) (0.057)
Tertiary Education Expenditure by Government -0.004 -0.016
(As Percentage of Total Government Education Expenditure) (0.014) (0.047)
Centralized Collective Bargaining 0.283 0.712
(0.184) (0.479)
Bribes, Payments and Favoritism 0.274 0.085
(0.367) (0.380)
Polity 0.037 0.041
(0.044) (0.129)
FDI as Percentage of GDP 0.023 0.088
(0.043) (0.117)
Intercept (Base Year=2000) 15.025⇤ 10.822
(6.031) (6.523)
Year 2001 -0.080
(0.173)
Year 2002 0.461
(0.504)
Year 2003 -0.214
(0.336)
Year 2004 -1.380
(1.152)
Year 2005 -1.073
(1.152)
Year 2006 -0.921
(1.022)
Year 2007 -0.802
(0.996)
Year 2008 -0.443
(0.725)
Year 2009 -1.233
(1.293)
Year 2010 -1.841
(1.447)
Year 2011 -1.510
(1.369)
Observations 1128 94
R2 0.175 0.402
Adjusted R2 0.160 0.338
p-value of F Statistic 4.081e-13⇤ 0.032⇤
Note: Panel Corrected Standard Errors for model 7 ⇤p<0.05
OLS results are for the year 2010
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In addition, models 7 and 8 above are run to examine the effect of developmental states on
state-business partnerships: (1) a pooled model containing all years from 2000 to 2011, and (2) a
single-year model based on observations in year 2010. As discussed earlier in the section on multiple
imputation, data on state-business partnerships are mired with high degree of missingness, which
inevitably make the imputation process less accurate. Data for year 2010 contain the least number of
missing values and are thus run as a single-year model as an added robustness check to the statistical
analysis. From table 2.3, however, both models do not provide conclusive statistical evidence to the
hypothesis that as a developmental state moves up the value chain, it will increase the number of
state-business partnerships. Importantly, the results may be inconclusive due to the heterogenous
nature of state-business partnerships across space and time: state-business partnerships may be
manifested in different forms for different countries and at different time periods, making statistical
comparisons difficult. For instance, state-business partnerships in South Korea may be represented
by the creation of hi-tech consortiums while partnerships in Indonesia may be more concentrated
around specific private-public infrastructure development. Moreover, due to the limitations of hi-tech
industries, the number of partnerships in South Korea may be less than that of Indonesia’s. Thus,
merely judging the number of state-business partnerships is insufficient – we should also pay attention
to the type and intensity of state-business partnerships. Case study analysis may be better suited to
investigate this hypothesis at a deeper level.31
2.6 Conclusion
This paper brings our attention to the importance of politics in GVCs/GPNs. Notably, the
developmental state is primarily driven by politics, not economics. Critics to the developmental state
argue that it will converge towards the neoliberal model in the era of dense economic globalization.
However, the neoliberal convergence argument proved to be too simplistic and underestimates the
resilience of politics in developmental states. Indeed, the empirical results of this paper show the
prevalence of the state in Asian economic affairs. Consequently, instead of being decoupled from the
state, local firms are still highly dependent on their governments.
31A more extensive research on state-business partnerships involving Japan and three of the tiger economies (Singapore,
South Korea, and Taiwan), as well as the tiger cub economies of Malaysia, Indonesia, Thailand and the Philippines, is
found in paper 2 of this dissertation.
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One could understand the actions of the developmental state through its goals. As discussed
earlier in the paper, the developmental state’s goal is to shore up economic growth in order to preserve
social order. In other words, politics not economics is what primarily motivates developmental states.
Consequently, while developmental states may find it more difficult to implement strict industrial
policies as they move higher up the value chain due to high degrees of technological uncertainty
and the lack of information, they will nonetheless find ways to do so (and indeed find ingenious
methods to tap the hi-tech markets) in the hopes of providing more incentives for local businesses to
participate and thrive in the value chain, as well as to reduce the probability of failed investments that
can result in domestic unhappiness and backlash. In addition, given that developmental states are
prone to nurture national champions and cultivate niche industries, the state’s reputation as a credible
leader in guiding the economic progress for the country is also at stake. The developmental state thus
finds it necessary to maintain a degree of oversight and control on the nation’s economy.
Overall, while the global production network certainly plays an important role in shaping the
developmental state’s economic options and trajectory, it does not guarantee a simple linear path of
neoliberal convergence. In fact, while developmental states may at first find it easy to participate
in value chains as they do not have to build up their own industries from scratch, they will be
faced with a competitive and uncertain environment once they are plugged into the GPN. Domestic
backlash resulting from global competition as well as the eagerness to help local firms to excel can
lead developmental states toward more aggressive industrial policies. Indeed, the global economy
is tightly intertwined with the domestic politics of different countries, and states do not always
gravitate toward the neoliberal model. Several forces are at work and developmental states orientate
themselves to suit first and foremost their political objectives.
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3 DEVELOPMENTAL STATES AND PARTNERSHIPS FOR INNOVATION
3.1 Introduction
Asia’s emerging economies have long enjoyed prosperity due to their comparative advantage
in low-cost labor. However, with the acceleration of technology and the resulting mechanization
of global manufacturing, Asian economies aspiring to sustain high growth rates and achieve strong
economic performance cannot merely depend on exporting labor-intensive goods. Economic re-
structuring and moving up the value chain will be imperative for these economies to maintain their
competitiveness. In other words, innovation is key for Asian economies to continue to grow and
thrive.
In an era of rapid technological advances, the most competitive economies are knowledge-based
economies (KBE). A central feature of KBEs is that these economies harness the resources of multiple
actors, from the government to the industry to universities, forging a trilateral synergistic relationship
between the actors and sustaining a virtuous cycle of economic innovation1. According to the
World Bank and OECD, a knowledge-based economy is one that has (1) an institutional regime that
“stimulates the acquisition, creation, dissemination, and use of knowledge and information to improve
its growth and welfare”, (2) an educated and skilled workforce to create, use and share knowledge, (3)
a technological adaption system made up of multiple actors ranging from firms to research institutes
to the government that will tap and assimilate the immense stock of global knowledge and adapt
it to local needs, and (4) an information and communications technology-enabled (ICT-enabled)
environment to facilitate the creation, processing and flow of information (WB (2012b) and ADB
(2014)).
Consequently, Asian economies aspiring to move up the global value chain (GVC) will need
both an enabling institutional regime to spur research and development, education and innovation,
as well as strong partnerships between the various stakeholders of innovation. Moreover, given the
pressing concern that some of the emerging Asian economies such as Malaysia and Thailand are
1This is known as the triple helix model of innovation. More will be explained in the later sections.
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stuck in a middle-income trap, which refers to the predicament that middle-income countries face
due to their lack of competitiveness in high-tech products on one hand and cheap low-end products
on the other making them a sandwiched class of economies, these economies have no choice but to
move up the value chain and plug themselves into the knowledge-based economy (ADB (2014)).
Indeed, moving towards a knowledge-based economy will no doubt help Asian economies to achieve
much more in economic productivity and output. The transformation towards a knowledge-based
economy will also ensure that countries stay adaptive and viable in the face of fierce global economic
competition and technological change.
Given the huge degree of information uncertainty and resource constraints in innovation, the
state needs to step in to not only provide an institutional framework conducive for innovation to occur
through policies and incentives, but also identify potential sources of high-technology to invest in.
The Asian developmental state, a state-led interventionist economic model consisting of neoliberal
and socialist elements, thus plays a critical role. Even for the case of high-income Asian economies
such as Japan, South Korea, Singapore and Taiwan, the developmental state is still important in
sustaining innovation and finding new areas of growth. Moreover, as Lee, Heo and Kim (2014) note,
strong partnerships between multiple stakeholders of innovation are most likely to be formed with
the support of the government.
This paper discusses the importance of the developmental state in helping Asian economies
engage in innovation, focusing on the role of the state in establishing partnerships with the industry
and universities. Importantly, how and under what conditions do state-business partnerships evolve
when a developmental state moves up the value chain? I argue that Asian developmental states that
are high up on the value chain will move away from a simple bilateral state-industry relation to
a more complex trilateral state-business-university relation under the auspices of the government,
leveraging the talent in universities to further drive innovation processes. This paper uses both the
developmental state model and the triple helix model to examine innovation partnerships in Asian
economies.
3.2 Developmental States and Innovation Partnerships
As discussed in paper 1 of this dissertation, the developmental state is an interventionist state that
actively promotes industrial policies and economic strategy to achieve growth. The high degree of
state intervention sets the developmental model apart from the neoliberal model, which advocates for
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the minimal role of the state. Moreover, industrial policies include not only protectionist trade policies
to shield infant industries from global competition, as characterized by Alice Amsden’s notion of
“getting the prices wrong” (Amsden (1989)), but also policies to forge strong economic partnerships
with targeted industries to ensure smooth state-business dynamics that runs in congruence with the
state’s economic goals. In other words, developmental states are highly active in establishing linkages
with the respective industries so that the state and industry are embedded in a strategic collaboration.
As Evans (1995) notes, one of the core elements of the developmental state is strategic embeddedness
within productive sectors of the economy, an alliance that facilitates the implementation of industrial
policies. Notable examples include the cooperation between the Korean state and the large chaebols,
the partnership between the Japanese government and the dominant keiretsu, as well as direct
government-linked corporations (GLCs) in Singapore.2
As Asian developmental states move up the value chain, they will face high degrees of uncer-
tainty inherent within innovation processes and in a global knowledge-based economy. Strategic
partnerships between the state and the industry, as well as between the state, the industry, and univer-
sities help to ameliorate the uncertainties involved. Notably, the principal challenge in innovation is
to first identify which science-based techniques and applications actually work to avoid resource and
time wastage. For instance, Wong (2011a) notes that even after several decades of basic research
in the biotech industry, scientists are still unclear “if, how, and which biotechnological techniques
and applications can work to improve human health” (p.7). Developmental states fill this gap of
uncertainty by actively identifying niche areas of research to focus on, and forging links between
public and private sectors, thereby creating a collaborative environment for actors to pool and share
information. Consequently, developmental states provide national innovation frameworks and strate-
gies for firms and universities to focus on, with partnerships that further inform and advance the
direction of innovation. Through cooperative networks made up of innovation actors, the uncertainty
of identifying which areas to research and innovate can be greatly reduced.
In addition, under the coordinative leadership of developmental states, local entrepreneurs are
encouraged to invest in particular high-tech sectors with the costs and risks of industrial upgrading
2The Korean chaebols are large conglomerates of family-owned firms that have close links with the Korean government.
Some examples include the Samsung group, LG, and Hyundai. The Japanese keiretsu is a loose grouping of dominant
companies in Japan such as Mitsubishi (includes Mitsubishi Electronic, Mitsubishi Chemical, and Nikon, to name a few),
Tokai (includes Toyota and Suzuki motors), and Sumitomo (includes Asahi Breweries, Mazda and NEC).
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offset by the state.3 For example, Singapore’s Economic Development Board (EDB) and Standards,
Productivity and Innovation Board (SPRING) have forged strong links with the biotech industry
as well as local public universities, providing funding and opportunities for productivity training
for local start-ups, and helping to link these start-ups to multinational corporations (MNCs) (Wong
(2011a)). Partnerships coordinated by the state can thus help to jump-start local innovation. Moreover,
the institutional environment setup by the state helps to facilitate technological diffusion from MNCs
to local firms. The South Korean liquid panel display industry provides a good example of the
crucial role the government plays in establishing linkages between local firms and MNCs to spur
technological diffusion and development (Lee, Heo and Kim (2014)).
The developmental state can also be seen as a mediator of conflicts in innovation partnerships.
Conflicts that arise between actors can be arbitrated by the state given its authority to enact laws and
policies. For instance, the state acts as a container of laws and practices within a country and sets
the various regional innovation frameworks that guide industrial development.4 Conflicts between
the various actors can be mediated within existing regulatory frameworks and through the various
government agencies in-charge. For instance, the Fourth Science and Technology Basic Plan of Japan
(2011-2015) not only outlines strategies to promote collaboration between the state, industry and
academy, but also highlights innovation regulations as well as institutions for intellectual property
rights protection (METI (2012)).
Some scholars have even gone to the extent to argue that the institutional arrangements for
innovation are unlikely to be created in the absence of the state (see Chang (1999)). Citing the
Austrian-American economist Joseph Schumpeter, Ha-Joon Chang argued that the process of inno-
vation often requires “complex institutional arrangements that cannot be provided by arm’s-length
market relationships and maximum price competition, which the neoliberals aim to attain through
liberalization” (ibid). Wong (2011a) has also noted that “all states – even the leanest of the liberal
market economies” have engaged in intervention in new industry development (p.40). Regardless of
the extent of importance of state intervention in innovation, the developmental state model is likely to
remain prominent in Asia as countries move up the value chain. Moreover, as Onis (1991) notes, the
3For more information, see Wong (2011a) p.22, and Cheng (1990).
4Also see Lee, Heo and Kim (2014) for a discussion on how the South Korean government acts as a mediator of
conflicts between firms in the Korean LCD industry.
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fact that private businesses have been “nurtured by the state in the first place has, in turn, rendered
them extraordinarily dependent on the state for their future survival” (p.116). Indeed, state-business
partnerships are also likely to persist in the innovation phase of industrialization even in mature Asian
economies due to path dependency. Lastly, in order to increase economic productivity and growth,
developmental states also have the incentive to create robust partnerships between the various actors
of innovation.
3.3 Innovation Partnerships and the Triple Helix Model
A related question is how innovation partnerships evolve over time. Moreover, under what condi-
tions do these partnerships evolve? To further understand innovation partnerships in developmental
states, as well as the complex changes in partnership linkages, I use a model of innovation called the
“Triple Helix Model” (Etzkowitz (1995), Etzkowitz and Leydesdorff (2000), and Lowe (1992)). The
Triple Helix Model involves the shift from a dyadic collaboration between the state and the industry
to a triadic one between the state, the industry, and the academy, so as to increase overall innovation
performance via network synergies. Applying the triple helix model to Asian economies, the main
actor driving the establishment of the trilateral relationship is the state.
The government and industry have long dominated patterns of industrialization. More recently,
since the rapid acceleration of ICT and resulting ongoing information explosion, the university
has emerged as a critical actor that has a competitive advantage over government laboratories and
research institutes within firms to synthesize and produce knowledge (ibid). Indeed, universities,
with their constant replenishment of students, are a highly productive wellspring of new ideas and
knowledge. Triadic partnerships are thus formed between the government, the industry, and the
academy. In addition, drawing from social network analysis theory, triadic partnerships are more
likely to result in innovation synergy compared to bilateral ones due to increased information flow
among the actors (resulting in reduced information uncertainty), and the greater pooling or sharing
of knowledge within the triad. As Cranmer, Desmarais and Menninga (2012) note, a synergy effect
means that the utility of collaborative ties between three actors in a triadic closure will be greater than
the sum of their dyadic level ties.5 Furthermore, the synergistic effects may lead to a self-sustaining
5Note that a triadic closure depicts a closed triangle in social network analysis and is the same as the triadic partnership
between the state, industry and academy that we have here.
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“virtuous cycle”, in which the actors reap exponentially greater benefits from the triadic partnership,
ultimately leading to innovation breakthroughs.
In addition, as states move from an industrial economy to a knowledge-based one, both the
government and the industry take on additional roles: (1) the government might act as a public
venture capitalist while retaining its role as an industrial regulator, and (2) firms may develop more
learning and research centers that resemble the university (Etzkowitz (2008)). Correspondingly,
universities may develop roles of the industry by “stimulating the development of new firms from
research, introducing the ‘capitalization of knowledge’ as an academic goal” (ibid p.1). The complex
interaction between the three key actors of innovation thus constitutes the triple helix model. Notably,
as Dzisah, Ranga and Zhou (2007) note, the ideal triple helix model consists of three core elements:
(1) the inclusion of the university as a core actor in national and regional innovation, (2) a movement
towards partnerships between the three major actors (government, industry and academy) in which
innovation is a result of the interactions between these actors rather than being wholly dictated
by any one particular actor, and (3) each actor “takes the role of the other”, thereby developing
new synergies in interaction and increasing the complexity of the innovation process. The positive
feedback or virtuous cycle resulting from innovation synergy will inform policies of the state and the
industry. Thus, even in the case of the developmental state, where the state takes the dominant role,
its innovation strategies will be increasingly informed by both the industry and the academy, and are
not formulated solely by the state itself.
3.3.1 Configurations of the Triple Helix Model
Etzkowitz (2008) notes two distinct configurations of triadic partnerships: (1) a statist model,
which focuses on the role of the state, and (2) a laissez faire model, which emphasizes the industry.
To elaborate, the statist model focuses on the role of the government in establishing triadic linkages
between the state, industry and academy. The government constitutes the dominant institutional
sphere, and the industry and academy are subsumed under the state (ibid). In addition, the gov-
ernment is expected to initiate new developmental projects with the help of specialized agencies
within the government bureaucracy. As such, innovation cannot occur without the auspices of the
state. Although other actors of innovation can inform state policy, the system of policy making is
concentrated at the top of the bureaucracy, making bottom-up approaches difficult and ineffective
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(ibid). A movement towards greater decentralization might occur as the country embeds itself in a
knowledge-based economy but the state retains the most power in innovation policy making.
On the other hand, a laissez faire model focuses on the driving force of the industry to spur
the creation of the trilateral relationship. The government, however, is expected to play only a
minimal role in regulation. In addition, the university is expected to provide only basic research and
train scientific talents required for innovation. Industry dynamics are key in driving the direction
of innovation and economic development. Importantly, several firms, as in a perfectly competitive
market, characterize the industry (ibid). Thus, as opposed to the statist model, the laissez faire model
places the industry at the top, while the government and universities act as secondary institutions of
innovation.
An interesting point to note is that countries sometimes alternate from one model to the other. For
instance, even in laissez faire archetypes such as the US, the role of the government might increase
at times of crisis or national emergencies, thus resembling the statist model (ibid). During World
War II, universities and industry were subsumed under the state, with many projects initiated by the
government. For example, the Manhattan Project to develop the atomic bomb targeted particular
key industries and personnel from universities, under the control of the US military. In addition,
with the threat of the Soviet Union after the war, the US space program in the 1960s depended
heavily on the government, which helped to establish ties between the industry and universities
(Ward (2012)). Nonetheless, short of a crisis or major economic restructuring, a country’s innovation
model is unlikely to swing from a laissez faire to statist model or vice versa.
Regardless of whether a country is statist or laissez faire, triple helix scholars assert that in
today’s knowledge-based economy, both types of regimes will ultimately trend towards a balanced
model, which places the university on par with the government and industry, with all three actors on
equal footing. Importantly, due to the demands of a knowledge-based economy, universities can no
longer be seen as secondary to the industry and the government. Thus, the statist and laissez faire
models might evolve to the ideal (balanced) model of the triple helix as countries get increasingly
plugged into the global knowledge-based economy.
3.3.2 The Developmental State and the Triple Helix Model
As should be apparent, given the dominant role of the government, the statist model best
characterizes the workings of the developmental state. Importantly, the statist model may not
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represent the reality of innovation partnerships for all Asian developmental states. In fact, the triple
helix model of trilateral relationships may only be applicable to the advanced Asian economies that
have successfully plugged into the knowledge-based society. Other developmental states in emerging
Asia might still be struggling with their bilateral relations between the state and the industry. Linkages
with universities may thus be weak or non-existent. In general, I argue that as Asian economies
move up the GVC, they will forge stronger partnerships with businesses in order to spur innovation.6
Moreover, Asian economies that are high up on the GVC will progress towards the (statist) triple
helix model of innovation, with strong trilateral relationships between the government, industry and
academy.7 I present a more nuanced set of configurations that cater specifically to the different types
of innovation partnerships in Asia (see below).
Figure 3.1 presents a template for the various stages of evolution in innovation partnerships for
Asian developmental states from a weak triadic configuration to a strong one. Correspondingly, four
successive phases of economic development eventually give rise to the triple helix ideal type: (1)
low-tech industrialization, (2) industrial transitional phase, (3) high-tech industrialization, and (4)
innovation take-off.
Stage 1: Low-tech industrialization (low GVC position) and premature triple helix: During the
initial stages of a country’s industrial development, collaboration between the government and the
industry is tenuous as the government is still trying to garner resources to create industrial parks and
regulatory frameworks to strengthen government-industry relations. University relations with the
government are also weak as the government channels the bulk of economic resources to the industry,
neglecting the university, as demand for highly educated talent is low. In addition, the government
does not actively encourage ties between the industry and university, as there is no demand for such
ties to be formed yet. This is characterized by figure 3.1(i). I would expect this form of triadic
dynamics for the low and lower-middle income Asian economies such as Philippines, Indonesia and
Thailand.8
6As seen from earlier discussions.
7Note that I do not present my assertions in the standard (linear) ‘hypothesis form’ that is found in many quantitative
papers as it would undermine the complexity involved in the triple helix evolution.
8Although Thailand is considered to be upper-middle income status by the World Bank from 2010 onwards, it has been
for the most part (from 2000-2011, the time period used for this study) a lower-middle income country.
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Figure 3.1: Triple Helix Topologies
Stage 2: Industrial transitional phase (middle GVC position) and edge configuration: As
the country develops, linkages between the government and the industry will become stronger.
Government expenditure to universities is expected to increase during this phase, as the industry
demands more talent and expertise. However, relations between the university and the other two
actors will be in the nascent stages and are likely to remain weak, as characterized by figure 3.1(ii).
The ‘edge configuration’ in figure 3.1(ii) thus only depicts the significant bilateral relationship
between the government and the industry.9 I would expect the upper-middle income economies such
as Malaysia to adopt this form of configuration.
Stage 3: High-tech industrialization (high GVC position) and strong 2-star configuration: Fol-
lowing further advancement of the economy and as the country focuses on high-tech manufacturing,
strong links would continue to be expected for government-industry relations. Moreover, strong
9In network theory, an edge is a connection between two actors in the network. Although all three actors are connected
in this case, I only consider significant connections. Weak connections are just for illustrative purposes to show how the
triple helix actually evolves.
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government-university relations would be developed at this stage, due to the high demand for skilled
workers. The resulting network configuration is the 2-star, which depicts the two sets of strong
bilateral relations between the government and the industry, as well as between the government and
the university.10 However, ties between the industry and university might still be developing, as the
country might not be fully plugged in to the knowledge-based economy. Nonetheless, demand for
industry-university collaboration is expected to steadily increase during this phase of industrialization.
A country at this phase of industrialization would be engaged in high-tech manufacturing, but has yet
to become a full-fledged creative economy. Figure 3.1(iii) illustrates this type of triadic relationship.
Stage 4: Innovation take-off (GVC apex) and the triple helix ideal type: Lastly, when a country
has moved into a predominantly high-tech and knowledge-based phase of economic development,
government-industry-university relations will cement to form the triple helix model – a closed triad
of tightly connected actors. Importantly, the triple helix model represents an ideal type, and in reality,
even highly developed economies might have yet to reach this stage. Thus, I posit that mature Asian
economies of Japan, South Korea, Taiwan and Singapore are likely to be in transition from the strong
2-star configuration of figure 1(iv) to the ideal type configuration seen in figure 1(iv).
3.4 Case Study Analysis of Asian Developmental States
I provide a comparative case study analysis of eight Asian countries – Japan, South Korea,
Singapore, Taiwan, Indonesia, Philippines, Thailand and Malaysia – to evaluate the evolution of
government-industry-university partnerships in Asia. The juxtaposition between the developed and
emerging economies of Asia11 serve to highlight the differences in trilateral partnership configurations
posited in the previous section. Moreover, in order to make my empirical analysis manageable,
I restrict the time period to 2000-2011, to control for marked changes in a country’s pattern of
industrialization.12 Data and information on the cases are drawn from inter-governmental organization
reports (OECD, World Bank, Asian Development Bank, UNESCO to name a few), journal articles
and books, as well as official ministry reports found in the various government websites.
10In network theory, a strong 2-star configuration depicts an actor that is tightly connected to two other actors.
11The four developed economies are Japan, South Korea, Singapore and Taiwan, while the emerging economies are
Indonesia, Philippines, Thailand and Malaysia. More will be explained in the later sections.
12This time period is also chosen because it corresponds to that in paper 1. As this paper is an extension to paper 1, I
have decided to use the same time period.
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The following subsections present the case studies beginning with the emerging Asian economies,
which are positioned low on the value chain, to show the nascent triadic relationship. As theorized,
even within emerging Asia, heterogeneity exists, with Indonesia, Philippines and Thailand belonging
to lower-middle income economies, and Malaysia at the higher end of the middle income spectrum.
Indeed, the triadic configuration of Malaysia may be different from the lower-middle income
economies. Subsequent subsections will move on to illustrate the mature Asian economies of Taiwan,
South Korea, Singapore and Japan. As discussed, these economies are likely to show a much stronger
triadic relationship. A comparative case analysis thus helps to elucidate more precisely the complex
triple helix dynamics in Asia.
3.4.1 Emerging Asia: Indonesia
Despite being listed as one of the most prominent emerging markets in Southeast Asia by the
World Bank, with GDP growing at an average of 5.31% from 2000 to 2011 (WB (2015)), Indonesia
still remains at stage 1 of industrial development and consequently has extremely tenuous triadic
relationship between the government, the industry and the university. Most of Indonesia’s exports
rest on natural resources such as petroleum and coal. In terms of domestic value-added, Indonesia
focuses on simple manufacturing and low technology, with mining, quarrying and petroleum as its
dominant industry.13 In addition, gross exports of high- and medium-high tech goods only make up
around 20% of total exports on average from 2000 to 2010 (OECD (2013a)). Moreover, bearing
in mind that these high and medium-tech goods may contain high foreign content imported from
abroad in the first place as part of the supply chain, the domestic value-added or local contribution
ultimately made to these goods often merely involve simple assembly and other low-skilled processes.
OECD notes that since 2000, “Indonesia has increased its propensity to import high-technology
manufactured goods from 5% [in 2000] to 14% in 2010” (ibid). Besides continued dependence on
foreign technology and its overall low-tech domestic production structure, Indonesia faces a lack of
skilled labor, political corruption, small English-speaking population and poor physical infrastructure
that all impede industrial upgrading. Indeed, Indonesia remains at the nascent stages of industrial
development, with multiple challenges for the government to tackle.
13Information and data obtained from UNCTAD-EORA GVC database for the time period 2000-11.
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Joint collaborations in research and development between the government and the industry are
extremely weak. Government-industry cooperation is often hindered by the lack of robust institutional
frameworks. For instance, the lack of adequate private property protection, weak implementation of
tax regulations, and the lack of transparency deter businesses from even starting. Intellectual property
rights are also rarely enforced due to political corruption (ibid). Nonetheless, a few ambitious
government initiatives designed to transform the Indonesian economy from a natural resource-driven
to an investment and innovation-driven one have sprung up since 2010 (with the establishment of the
National Innovation Committee (KIN)), but Indonesia still lacks the capacity and political will for
robust innovation to take place. Moreover, even with recent initiatives, research and development is
still concentrated within government research institutes, with very little cooperative projects with the
industry or the university (ibid).
Funding for research in Indonesian universities comes primarily from the government. However,
the government only allocates a very modest share of research expenditure to universities (ibid).
Consequently, the publication performance in international refereed journals and patent activity are
rare (see UNESCO (2010)). Moreover, very few research connections exist between government
research institutes and the universities. In addition, as Lakitan, Hidayat and Herlinda (2012) note,
although “R&D collaboration has been encouraged at least for two decades...scientific productivity
of public R&D and higher education institutes has not increased as expected” (p.228).
Only a few initiatives have been made by the government to encourage university-industry
linkages, all with little success (see OECD (2013a)). This is due to the budget constraints imposed
on government-sponsored schemes. For instance, unspent allocations need to be returned to the
government every financial year and “all income generated from industry projects has to be transferred
to the Ministry of Finance” (ibid, p.172). Consequently, the high disincentives to participate in
government schemes, political corruption and bureaucratic red tape make university-industry relations
tenuous. Overall, Indonesia characterizes the premature triple helix configuration, with a very weak
triadic connection among innovation actors.
3.4.2 Philippines
Philippines sets itself apart from the the other emerging economies in Asia in that it is focused
on services, in particular the information-technology business process outsourcing (IT-BPO) service
industry, as its main engine for growth. However, it is at best still in the process of transitioning from
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stage 1 to 2, with a production structure still largely low-tech, and with weak triadic connections
among innovation actors overall (ADB (2013)). To add, although the government has drawn out
strategic plans for industrial upgrading by encouraging the expansion of IT software and services, as
well knowledge-process outsourcing that includes medical transcription, web design and animation,
the bulk of Philippines’ IT-BPO industry rests on low value-add call centers (ibid). Moreover, a
key component of Philippines economy, constituting 9%-10% of GDP from 2000 to 2011, are
remittances from over 4 million Filipinos working overseas thereby making Philippines one of the
most remittance-dependent countries in the world (ibid). Consequently, Philippines is still very much
a developing economy that is positioned fairly low on the GVC.14
Collaboration between the government and the industry is slightly more visible in Philippines
than in Indonesia, but linkages remain weak. Since the mid-2000s, the Philippine government
has instituted innovation initiatives such as the Philippine Cyber Corridor and Next Wave Cities
Initiative as special efforts to promote and expand the IT-BPO industry into higher value-added
activities and to further develop ties with private IT-BPO firms to fine-tune policies (BPAP (2007))
Moreover, consultations with private IT-BPO firms helped the Philippine government to rapidly
expand the IT industrial parks in the country and develop more technical-related training programs
for its workforce (Keitel and Ledesma (2013)). However, these innovation strategies and partnerships
are all fairly recent and are still in their embryonic stage (ADB (2013)). Joint R&D projects between
the government and the IT-BPO industry remain rare and non-existent. In addition, public sector
weakness such as bureaucratic red tape and corruption are still rife. The enforcement of government
policies, laws and regulations also remain weak for both the central and local governments, hampering
ambitious initiatives and partnerships (ibid).
Government funding for universities in Philippines remains very low compared to other emerging
Asian economies discussed in this paper. Comparing data from the UNESCO Institute of Statistics,
government expenditure in tertiary institutes as a percentage of GDP for Philippines is only a mere
0.35% on average from 2000 to 2011, compared to 0.41% in Indonesia, 0.69% in Thailand and 1.86%
in Malaysia. Correspondingly, government funding for university research in Philippines can be seen
to be very lacking. Moreover, given that regulatory frameworks take a long time to implement due to
14For more information on each country’s position on the value chain, see table 3.1.
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the lack of coordination among ministries and government agencies, robust innovation partnerships
are unlikely to be formed with universities.
While universities have increasingly linked up with the industry for joint research, “collaborative
and published works are still very modest in scale” (Vea (2013), p.13). As Vea (2013) further notes,
government efforts have also been lackluster in bringing the industry and university together for joint
R&D. In addition, from the governments strategic initiatives and roadmaps, the emphasis seems to
be highly focused on establishing strong inter-firm linkages (between local and foreign enterprises)
for technological diffusion to occur, than forging robust university-industry relations (ADB (2013)).
Overall, Philippines can be seen as having a triple helix that is transitioning from a premature
one to one that has a strong bilateral government-industry relation, as characterized by stage 2
of industrial development, but much remains to be done. The current triadic framework for the
Philippines is still very much a stage 1 configuration, and unless robust policies are implemented to
strengthen the institutional framework for cooperation to occur, ambitious initiatives in themselves
will not bring about a successful transition. Nonetheless, as compared to Indonesia, Philippines still
remains slightly ahead in its innovation progress.
3.4.3 Thailand
Similar to Philippines, Thailand can be seen as being in transition from stage 1 to 2 of economic
development. Since the early 2000s, the electronics and global automotive sectors have been
increasing in prominence (OECD (2013a)). Moreover in 2006, Thailand’s exports of hard disk drives
constitute 48% of the global market (ibid). Notably, Japanese firms such as Sony, Toshiba, Hitachi
and Mitsubishi (to name a few) comprise the bulk of MNCs in Thailand. That being said however,
despite the focus on high-tech industries and the presence of global lead firms, productivity has
grown slowly and technological diffusion from MNCs has been limited (WB (2012a)). The domestic
value added for the electronics and automotive industries remains low as most local producers are
involved in the assembly of parts and components and other labor-intensive activities (see OECD
(2013a), AIT (2003) ,and Bonaglia (2006)). Moreover, due to weak supporting domestic industries,
Thailands high-tech manufacturing depends largely on imported parts and raw material (Bonaglia
(2006)). As a result, Thailand is at best slowly transitioning from a low-tech to a medium-tech
industrial base, and is still positioned fairly low on the GVC.
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Product R&D and innovation partnerships in Thailand are severely lacking. Small-medium
enterprises (SMEs) which constitute 78% of Thai employment are not linked to MNCs, thus greatly
hampering the innovation progress within the country (OECD (2013a)). Moreover, only 6% of
local firms invest in R&D, with the main aim of enhancing production processes rather than product
innovation (ibid). In addition, due to the long-standing dependency on cheap labor, only a paucity
of firms will be motivated to invest in innovation and move up the value chain. Thus, despite the
government’s strategic initiatives to encourage innovation, the inherent weakness of Thailand’s
innovative capacity impedes the implementation and actualization of the government’s master plans.
Furthermore, because of the lack of transparency and accountability, public research institutes are not
highly viewed as credible sources of knowledge, and few collaborative ties exist with private firms
(Schiller (2006) and Intarakumnerd (2010)). Moreover, although the Thai government has established
several high-tech industrial clusters, cluster policies remain weak and fragmented (Arnold, Bell,
Bessant and Brimble (2000)). Consequently, government-industry cooperation is tenuous.
Government funding and R&D activities within universities remain low (OECD (2013a)). As
noted earlier, the Thai government’s expenditure in tertiary institutes as a percentage of GDP is
0.69% on average from 2000 to 2011, a figure that is higher than both Indonesia and the Philippines
but still lags considerably behind Malaysia. Moreover, outdated curricula and university programs
further obstruct innovation partnerships (ibid). The persistent weakness in the quality and funding of
university education in Thailand shows to a large extent the negligence of the Thai government in
channeling resources and revising policies for Thai tertiary education.
Due to the low quality of university education, university-industry linkages have also been highly
limited. Similar to the case of public research institutes, firms generally do not regard universities as
wellsprings of knowledge. Moreover, even when research collaboration exists, the ties are formed
based on personal contacts without an elaborate institutional framework (ibid). More recently, the
Thai government has outlined a 15-year Tertiary Education Framework (2008-22) that is geared
towards university-industry collaboration, but the impact remains to be seen. Overall, even with
strategic initiatives for innovation partnerships, Thailand’s triple helix is only slowly developing out
of its fledging phase and is far from evident.
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3.4.4 Malaysia
Malaysia is positioned at stage 2 of industrial development and consequently has strong bilateral
government-industry relations. Malaysia is classified by the World Bank as an upper-middle income
country and has an average GDP per capita15 of US$16432.30 (2000-11), which is much higher than
other economies in emerging Asia, although it still lacks quite considerably behind the mature Asian
economies.16 Malaysia’s major export sectors are the electronics and automotive industries, with
semi-conductors making up 40% of total exports (OECD (2013a)). In addition, among ASEAN
economies17 Malaysia ranks after Singapore in terms of economic competitiveness, leading Thailand,
Indonesia and the Philippines by a fairly wide margin (WEF (2011)).18 Although high-tech exports
in Malaysia account for approximately 59.85% of all manufactured exports on average from 2000 to
2011, the corresponding percentage of domestic value-added is only about 24.38 % (Thiruchelvam,
Chandran and Ng (2011)).19 Malaysia, like Thailand, mainly exports technology-based products
that have high foreign import content, and that production is structured mostly around the assembly
of manufactured goods and other labor-intensive operations (Rasiah (2009)). Nonetheless, in
comparison with Indonesia, Philippines and Thailand, Malaysia has a much stronger institutional
framework with strong government-led industrial clusters in the electronics sector that help to spur
innovation. Moreover, the electronics clusters have had increasing success in creating local firms with
international reputation and high innovative capacity such as Engtek Group, Globetronics Technology
and Vitrox Corporation (OECD (2013a)). In addition, Malaysia has also channeled considerable
resources in developing its own auto industry, with Proton and Perodua as the prime examples.
Consequently, although Malaysia still lags behind the mature Asian economies, it is situated higher
up the value chain compared to Indonesia, Philippines and Thailand.
15GDP per capita, PPP, current US$
16As a comparison, the average GDP per capita for Indonesia, Philippines and Thailand are US$6150.15, US$4449.43,
and US$9966.63 respectively over the same time period. Data obtained from the World Bank Development Indicators.
17ASEAN economies refer to the ten Southeast Asian economies of Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand, Indonesia, the
Philippines, Laos, Vietnam, Brunei, Cambodia, and Mynamar.
18According to the Global Competitiveness Report by the World Economic Forum (2011), Singapore overall ranking in
global competitiveness is 3 while Malaysia ranks 16, followed by Thailand (38), Indonesia (44), and the Philippines (85).
19Although data is not available from 2000-04 and 2011, the composition of exports, especially domestic value-added,
is likely to be largely the same as 2005-10.
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Under the political leadership of Badawi, who served as Malaysia’s Prime Minister between
2003 and 2009, the developmentalist agenda of collaborating with selected industries was strongly
promoted (Gomez (2012)). Government-linked corporations, which are the dominant firms in
Malaysia, were tied up with MNCs and SMEs such that local firms can gain access to foreign markets
and innovation (ibid). Strong industrial cluster policies that encouraged strategic alliances among
firms were instituted, especially in the electronics and automotive sectors. The rise of Engtek and
Globetronics was in large part due to their connections with MNCs in the Penang electronic cluster
(ibid). In addition, public research institutes such as the Malaysian Palm Oil Board (MPOB) and
the Malaysian Rubber Board (MRB) in the agricultural sciences work closely with the agriculture
and forestry industry for research and development (Chandran, Farha and Veera (2008)). Thus,
government-industry linkages are strong and much more pronounced compared to those in Indonesia,
Philippines and Thailand.
Government funding for universities in Malaysia leads the other emerging Asian economies.20
Since 2007, the Malaysian government has reformed and instituted a rating system for higher
education institutes (SETARA) to promote best practices and upgrade the quality of education in
public universities (OECD (2013a)). Moreover, the government created grants that promoted R&D,
patenting and the commercialization of research. However, even with the massive government
funding and well-intentioned initiatives, research output has remained low due to the lack of technical
expertise and the heavy teaching load in universities (ibid). In addition, although the government has
created several plans for research within universities, it has not supported the collaboration between
public research institutes and universities. Overall, government-university partnerships are still seen
to be fairly tenuous.
University-industry linkages are highly limited in Malaysia due to the lack of industrial relevance
in university research (OECD (2013a)). Moreover, the lack of intermediary agencies that help to link
the universities and industry together also make it difficult for both actors to collaborate. Despite
the proliferation of high-tech industrial clusters that benefited from strong government support,
the university’s involvement in these clusters remains non-existent (ibid). As such, although the
bilateral tie between the government and the industry is evident, government-university and especially
20As shown earlier in the statistics drawn from UNESCO.
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industry-university ties are still weak. The lack of partnerships and innovation synergy may partly
explain why Malaysia is caught in the middle-income trap, which is a situation where the domestic
economy is unable to evolve and develop new market technologies.
Overall, as seen from above cases, Indonesia is worst at producing innovation partnerships,
followed by Philippines and Thailand. Indonesia is situated at the lowest stage of industrial develop-
ment, while Philippines and Thailand can be seen as transiting from stage 1 to 2, though the triple
helix of all three countries are in general premature and very weak. Malaysia exhibits the strongest
triple helix configuration among the emerging economies, but most of the strength is concentrated in
the bilateral tie between the government and the industry. The next section discusses the advanced
Asian economies of Taiwan, South Korea, Singapore and Japan, and provides a useful comparison to
the emerging economies of Asia. In terms of the triple helix topology, I expect a marked contrast
between the emerging and advanced Asian economies, with the advanced Asian economies likely to
be in stage 3 or 4 of development and thus forging a much stronger trilateral connection.
3.4.5 Advanced Asian Economies: Taiwan
Since the 2000s, Taiwan is positioned at stage 4 of economic development, which yields a strong
trilateral relationship. The high-tech electronics sector constitutes Taiwan’s core manufacturing
strength, with local firms such as TSMC, UMC, ACER, Compal Electronics and Hon Hai Precision
Industries (Foxconn) attaining international brand recognition. The domestic value-added of Taiwan’s
electronics sector makes up the bulk of electronics gross exports, averaging 59.44% from 2000 to
2011, a stark contrast from the emerging economies discussed earlier.21 Notably, SMEs dominate
the Taiwan economy, with the majority of the workforce employed in SMEs (Chen, Lin and Chu
(2013)). Interestingly, given that SMEs generally lack resources for R&D and incentives to innovate,
how did Taiwan transform itself from an industrial to an innovation economy? The key to this
puzzle is Taiwans longstanding practice of the developmental state model, in which the government
actively promotes competitive manufacturing, exports and innovation through partnerships and
nimble policies. Consequently, as Dent (2007) notes, Taiwan’s SME sector is highly global, with
successful shifts from original equipment manufacture (OEM) subservience to original design
21Data obtained and analyzed from the UNCTAD-EORA GVC database.
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manufacture (ODM), and more recently to original design logistics (ODL) and global logistics (GL)
in international supply chains.
Central to Taiwan’s economic success is the government’s efforts to generously create and
support non-profit R&D organizations that act as inclusive hubs for innovation partnerships (Jan and
Chen (2006)). The prime example is the Industrial Technology Research Institute (ITRI), which is
“most visible and dynamic” amongst the organizations (Chen, Lin and Chu (2013), p.405). Founded
in 1973 by Taiwan’s Ministry of Economic Affairs (MOEA), the ITRI serves both as a public policy
arm that promotes innovation, and as a R&D hub that has over the years successfully forged strong
ties with the industry and universities, creating an extensive and complex network of technological
partnerships (ibid). The ITRI has seen considerable results since the 1980s, with local spin-offs
of the Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company (TSMC) and the United Microelectronics
Corporation (UMC), which are both amongst the top three semiconductor foundries in the world. To
note, the ITRI and other semi-government research institutions also create a conducive environment
for SMEs to conduct research, by providing the infrastructure, direction and funding for R&D
to thrive in local firms. As Hsu and Chiang (2001) and Chen, Lin and Chu (2013) note, ITRI
has also collaborated and transferred technology know-how to SMEs, creating new business and
upgrading opportunities. Moreover, through its training programs, ITRI is the main supplier of
industrial leaders in Taiwan (Chen, Lin and Chu (2013)). In addition, ITRI has also engaged with
universities for joint R&D collaboration (ibid). For example, one of Taiwan’s most prestigious
research universities, the National Tsing Hua University (NTHU) has a joint research center with
ITRI focusing on nano-electronics and digital imaging. Moreover, as a technological research hub,
ITRI acts as an intermediary and provides opportunities for both businesses and universities to work
together (Chang and Shih (2004)). Overall, after more than four decades of experience, the ITRI is
the governments main vehicle for innovation policy and has an extensive network of partnerships
that is still expanding.
In conjunction with government-sponsored research institutes, strategic industrial clusters also
provide a platform for innovation partnerships. Taiwan’s high-tech clusters have been gaining
momentum since the establishment of the highly successful Hsinchu Science-based Industrial Park
(HSIP), home to Taiwan’s largest firms such as ACER, TSMC and UMC. MNCs such as Logitech
and Philips are also located in the park. Notably, Taiwan’s industrial clusters welcome not only
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businesses, but also research universities that value-add to overall cluster synergy (Chen, Lin and
Chu (2013)). For example, Taiwan’s prestigious National Chiao Tung University and National Tsing
Hua University, both technical powerhouses, are all located within the HSIP. These two universities
provide HSIP with talent for basic research, high quality human resource for information exchange
on product innovation and diffusion of knowledge on recent scientific breakthroughs in the academic
realm (ibid). In addition, specialized research institutes such as the National Synchrotron Radiation
Research Center (NSSRC) and the National Center for High Performance Computing (NCHC) can
also be found in the cluster. As Chen, Lin and Chu (2013) note, the resulting industrial cluster
effect of HSIP helps to (1) generate rapid knowledge and technological diffusion, (2) provide greater
attraction for foreign MNC investment due to talent agglomeration, (3) reduce cost due to the
integration of upstream and downstream industries, and (4) facilitates the networking of personnel
within the cluster, resulting in tighter connections between the government, industry and academy.
Indeed, the resulting economic impact of a successful industrial cluster like the HSIP will be greater
than the sum of its parts. Strong trilateral partnerships create a virtuous cycle that will further enhance
innovation development.
The triple helix model is highly robust and evident in Taiwan’s case. Under the direction of the
Taiwan government, innovation frameworks geared towards forging strong trilateral relationships
between the government, the industry and the academy have been developed and refined since the
1980s. As Taiwan continues on its high-tech knowledge-based economy, the triple helix framework
is likely to evolve in complexity and intensity.
3.4.6 South Korea
As one of the most high-tech economies in the world, South Korea (henceforth known as “Korea”)
is not only engaged in intensive high-tech manufacturing, but also in product innovation (OECD
(2009)). Korea thus has a stage 4 knowledge-based economy with a strong triple helix. Since the late
1990s and early 2000s, Korea has produced a number of prominent global lead firms such as Samsung,
LG, SK, POSCO and Hyundai. Perhaps the most well-known is Samsung (Electronics), which is
the world’s largest electronics company.22 In contrast to Taiwan, Korea’s economy is dominated
by large, highly diversified, family-owned companies called chaebols. Chaebols remain shielded
22Samsung is a large conglomerate consisting of several affiliate companies. The most notable one is Samsung
electronics, followed by Samsung Heavy Industries, which is one of the world’s largest shipbuilders.
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by the government through subsidies and tax incentives, especially during Korea’s industrialization
phase in the 1980s and 90s, and arguably have the most resources for innovation development.23
Nonetheless, SME innovation has gradually risen in importance, especially after the Asian Financial
Crisis in 1997.24 Regardless of whether it is the chaebols or SMEs, the Korean government, under its
developmental state paradigm, plays a highly directive and important role to the country’s innovation
pathways.
State-business partnerships in innovation are well established in Korea. States often develop
strong ties with the chaebol via public research institutes (PRIs). For instance, PRIs (along with
universities and SMEs) are important innovation collaborators with Samsung (OECD (2009)).
Moreover, R&D consortia organized by the government often consist of PRIs and private firms
(ibid). Fruitful innovation outcomes have been achieved from these consortia. For example, the
Electronics and Telecommunications Research Institute (ETRI)25 has helped to develop state-of-the-
art digital and semiconductor technologies, such as Mini-Super Computer (TiCOM) and High Density
Semiconductor Microchips (DRAM), with private firms. In addition, government funded programs
are usually cooperative in nature, requiring state-business or business-university partnerships (ibid).
Moreover, free economic zones (FEZs) such as the Incheon and Daegu-Gyeongbuk FEZs consisting
of private firms, PRIs and university research centers have also been set up to spur innovation
partnerships (Dent (2007)).
The government has also actively encouraged research in universities through talent enhancement
policies and PRI engagements. For example, Korea’s Ministry of Education, Science and Technology
(MEST) rolled out a plan26 that invested over USD$750 million from 2008-13 to attract top science
and technology overseas researchers to engage in scientific collaboration with Korean professors
(OECD (2009)). PRIs and universities have also linked up to train graduate students. For instance,
the Korean Institute of Science and Technology (KIST), a government research institute, has set
up graduate programs with nine Korean universities, requiring participating students to be involved
23The Korean government has somewhat relaxed protectionist policies for chaebols, but is nonetheless still deeply
intertwined with these corporations. For more information, see Dent (2007).
24The crisis exposed the bureaucratic weakness and inefficiencies of some of the chaebols, prompting a gradual shift
away from chaebol reliance. However, this shift is largely ineffective due to enduring over dependency on chaebols as the
main driver of the Korean economy.
25ETRI is a prominent government research institute in Korea.
26This plan is known as the World Class University program.
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in KIST research projects as part of their curriculum (ibid). In addition, to further encourage
collaborative research, the government created the University of Science and Technology (UST) that
runs only as a graduate school, and is affiliated with 22 PRIs (ibid).
R&D collaboration between firms and universities are also significant. Business-financed R&D
in Korean higher education institutes are amongst the highest in the OECD area, pointing to the strong
industry-university innovation linkages (ibid). Moreover, since the early 1990s, the government
has administered an array of measures to encourage industry-university collaboration. One notable
policy is the Law on Fostering Industrial Education and Industry-University Cooperation that was
implemented in 2003. By 2005, over 300 partnership offices have been established in the universities
(ibid). In addition, the government has enacted a law that allows professors and researchers to run
their own venture businesses in their university laboratories (under certain conditions), in order to
promote greater spin-offs from universities and research institutes.
Overall, the government is the main actor in spearheading R&D in Korea. Similar to Taiwan, the
triple helix model in Korea is strong and steadily improving. No doubt, the triple helix is critical to
Koreas innovation economy, and the government is likely to continue channeling significant resources
to improve this trilateral relationship.
3.4.7 Singapore
Since the late 1990s and early 2000s, Singapore has shifted its reliance away from MNC-led
innovation to indigenous technology development, successfully transiting from a stage 3 high-tech
manufacturing economy to a stage 4 creative economy that focused on research and development
(Wong (2005)). With the establishment of the National Science and Technology Board (NSTB) and
the implementation of two five-year National Technology Plans, the scope of public R&D, local high
technology entrepreneurship, and basic research in the sciences were intensified (ibid). Technology
development starting in 2000 emphasized biomedical sciences and stem cells research, shifting
Singapore to the frontiers of innovation research.27 Recent achievements in Singapore’s biomedical
sciences industry include a H1N1 flu vaccine (phase I clinical trial28), SARS easy detection kit,
27The strategic shift towards biomedical sciences also acts as a diversification of risks for the Singapore economy, away
from its traditional reliance on the IT and electronics sector, which faces increasingly stiff competition from powerhouses
such as Korea and Taiwan, as well as rising regional powers such as Malaysia and China.
28This phase includes testing to a small group of people to gauge the best dose required.
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and multiple advances in regenerative medicine.29 Behind the complex dynamics of the Singapore
economy is the government, which is instrumental in identifying niche markets to focus on, as
well as formulating strategic industrial policies. Notably, despite the top-down approach of policy
formulation, a flexible and pragmatic approach guides the actual implementation of policies, in
which earlier strategic plans can be replaced with new ones if opportunities and threats have changed
drastically (OECD (2013a)). The triple helix model is highly developed in Singapore, with the
government as the prime actor who actively creates linkages between the participants of innovation.
Government-industry linkages are strong in Singapore. The two key government agencies that
chart the course of Singapore’s economic development and are responsible for spurring entrepreneur-
ship are the Economic Development Board (EDB) and the Standards, Productivity and Innovation
Board (SPRING). For instance, in order to encourage high-tech entrepreneurship, EDB introduced
a public co-investment scheme in 2001 to stimulate early-stage business angel investment (OECD
(2013a)). In addition, a mega business park called One-North was created in the late 2000s30, which
is an innovation city within Singapore consisting of public research institutes, higher education
centers, MNCs31, local tech startups, intellectual property law firms as well as hotels, convention
halls, and living quarters for research scientists (Wong (2011b)). Notably, the One-North park is
composed of two highly specialized science hubs: (1) Biopolis, which houses biomedical-related
institutes, and (2) Fusionopolis, which is an ICT hub that focuses on engineering.32 To increase
bureaucratic coordination and efficiency, government agencies such as EDB, SPRING, and the Media
Development Authority (MDA) have also been relocated to One-North. Moreover, to further enhance
research partnerships and knowledge sharing, the Agency for Science, Technology and Research
(A*STAR)33 has established a number of consortia such as the Singapore Bioimaging Consortium
and the Singapore Stem Cell Consortium within One-North. Indeed, the government has invested
considerable resources to foster cluster synergies among innovation actors.
29Due to the complex scientific names and processes, I have omitted the specificities. For additional writeup and
information, see http://www.nrf.gov.sg/scientific-advances
30The first phase has been completed with additional phases under construction.
31Some notable examples include GlaxoSmithKline (GSK), Novartis, Abbott, Takeda and Lucasfilm.
32An upcoming media hub known as Mediapolis, which specializes in high-tech interactive media research, is currently
under construction.
33Formerly National Science and Technology Board (NSTB).
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Besides the involvement in research consortia and science parks, PRIs have also established
themselves within universities for greater research collaboration. Supported by the National Research
Foundation (NRF) and the Ministry of Education (MOE), PRIs such as the Cancer Science Institute
of Singapore and the Center for Quantum Technologies are housed within the National University of
Singapore (NUS), Singapores oldest and most prestigious research university. Other PRIs such as the
Energy Research Institute and the Singapore Membrane Technology Center are located within the
Nanyang Technological University (NTU).34 Together, these PRIs leverage the talent pool within
universities to conduct cutting-edge scientific research that can translate into industrial outcomes.
The frequent networking between PRIs and universities also create more opportunities for knowledge
diffusion and exchange of ideas across organizations, critical for high-tech research breakthroughs to
occur.
Since 2000, Singaporean universities have increasingly emphasized the commercialization of
technologies and collective R&D with private enterprises (OECD (2013a)). Wong, Ho and Singh
(2007) also found that the most common partners of innovating firms in Singapore are universities
and PRIs, which have become more important than other firms within the same industry as well
as research-consulting firms. Furthermore, Singapore also ranks sixth on university-industry R&D
collaboration in the 2010-11 Global Competitiveness Report (WEF (2011)). More specifically, in
2001, NUS has setup a new division called NUS Enterprise, which is the chief coordinating agency
within the university to manage activities related to the commercialization of technologies and
entrepreneurship. Active industrial partnerships and intellectual property advising are also supported
via the division. Through NUS Enterprise and its Entrepreneurship Center, networks of entrepreneurs
comprising researchers, students, venture capitalists and angel investors have been formed to provide
spin-offs (Wong, Ho and Singh (2007)). Indeed, Wong, Ho and Singh (2007) note that NUS has
shifted from the traditional university model to what Etzkowitz, Webster, Gebhardt and Terra (2000)
termed as an “Entrepreneurship” university, which is critical in developing triple helix synergies.
Despite Singapore’s fairly recent developments in high-tech entrepreneurship and basic research,
it has managed to create a vibrant and dynamic knowledge-based society. The government’s
34NTU is another research university in Singapore. Due to the small geographical size of Singapore, only NUS and
NTU are research intensive and highly comprehensive universities. Other universities such as the Singapore Management
University (SMU), Singapore University of Technology and Design (SUTD) and Singapore Institute of Technology (SIT)
are all fairly young universities that are established post 2000.
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aggressive and targeted policies to forge robust links between innovation actors, coupled with an
influx of global talent, have resulted in a virtuous cycle within the triple helix that continues to
perpetuate innovation and research advancement. Indeed, Singapore presents a highly successful
case of multifaceted interactions between innovation actors.
3.4.8 Japan
Japan is the archetype of the developmental state and is the world’s third largest economy that
has a high-tech industrial and research base. Indeed, Japan is undoubtedly in stage 4 of economic
development. Although Japan faced an agonizing lost decade35, its high-tech development has
remained at the frontiers of science. Japan is also among the leading OECD countries on R&D
intensity (2.49% of GDP in 2010) and business R&D (77% of GERD36) (OECD (2008)). With
regards to economic competitiveness, Japan ranks sixth in 2011, second only to Singapore in the
Asian region (WEF (2011)). Similar to many Asian economies, Japan has traditionally focused on
the electronics and automotive industries as strategic sectors of development, giving rise to several
prominent MNCs such as Sony, Mitsubishi, Olympus, Toyota, Honda and Nissan, to name a few. The
great success of Japanese firms have led other developing Asian economies to rely on Japanese MNCs
for technological learning and diffusion.37 Since 2001, under the Second Science and Technology
Basic Plan (2001-2005)38, the Japanese government has encouraged the rapid advancement of new
areas of technology, such as environmental sciences, life sciences, IT, and nanotechnology (Eddington
(2008)). Importantly, while innovation has been largely confined to the large Japanese conglomerates
known as the keiretsu companies, more collaborative triple helix type of research partnerships have
been created since the 2000s (Hosono and Nakayama (2012) and Eddington (2008)). Similar to the
other advanced developmental states, Japan’s innovation policies are still largely top-down in nature,
with government agencies playing the most assertive role in forging strong trilateral partnerships.
Industrial clusters form the backbone of Japan’s triple helix model. Cluster initiatives are usually
top-down, highly institutionalized, and launched by the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry
35Some scholars have argued that Japan faced two lost decades from 1990-2000, and 2000-10.
36Gross domestic expenditure on R&D. Figure is based on OECD report for 2010.
37This is seen earlier on in the case of Thailand’s automotive sector, but other countries such as Indonesia and Malaysia
also rely on Japanese firms. Even the current developed economies of South Korea, Taiwan and Singapore have depended
on Japanese technological diffusion.
38The Third Science and Technology Basic Plan (2006-2010) also focuses on high-tech innovation in the same sectors.
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(METI), and the Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports and Science and Technology (Eddington
(2008)). As discussed, industrial clusters provide a conducive environment and platform for private
firms, research institutes and universities to pool resources and share information. Beginning in
2001, METI launched a comprehensive Industrial Clusters Program designed to upgrade existing
clusters and help local SMEs to gain more product development support and intellectual property
protection via networks of collaboration (ibid). One prominent offshoot is the Hokkaido Super
Cluster Promotion Project, which began in 2001. By 2005, Hokkaido had a massive collaborative
network comprising 96 companies, 21 universities and public research institutes, 2 local government
organizations, and 82 financial institutions.39 Indeed, multiple actors spanning government agencies,
universities and firms collaborate in the ambitious super-cluster project, unprecedented in the rest of
Asia.
In addition, while METI focused on the industry and downstream commercialization, MEXT
emphasized on universities, public research institutes, and upstream R&D (ibid). Under the Knowl-
edge Cluster Initiative, MEXT encouraged tighter industry-university-government linkages and also
pushed for the joint development of new technologies (ibid). Under the directions of MEXT, over 16
knowledge clusters were formed all over Japan, specializing in high-tech industries in-lieu with the
governments Second and Third Science and Technology Basic Plan (ibid). Indeed, Japan’s industrial
cluster planning showed the government’s high degree of organization, experience and discipline in
forging government-industry-university relations.
Besides industrial clusters, government law reforms also helped to spur innovation partner-
ships between the university and the industry. For example, the Japanese Technology Licensing
Organization (TLO) Act in 1998 promoted technology transfers from universities to private firms
via TLOs, which obtains patents for university research and licenses out to private firms, acting
as intermediary between the academy and the industry. In addition, the Japanese Bayh-Dole Act
(inspired by the American model) helped to entrust patent rights from public research funds to
trustees (Hosono and Nakayama (2012)). The corporatization of Japanese national universities in
2004 also facilitated university-industry technology transfers when these universities started to run
39Sub-networks of similar and specialized groups of actors are likely to be found. For more information on the Hokkaido
Super Cluster Promotion Project, see METI’s website: http://www.hkd.meti.go.jp/hokii/s cluster e/
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their own TLOs (ibid). Thus, entrepreneurship-oriented reforms beginning in the late 1990s have
paved way for the deepening of relations in the Japanese triple helix.
Like the other advanced Asian economies, Japan not only has a high-tech manufacturing base, but
also strong triple helix connections. The highly institutionalized and elaborate triple helix programs
point to the resolve of the Japanese government in sustaining and nurturing an innovation economy
for the future. Given the scope and depth of the Japanese government’s industrial cluster policies and
national science and technology five-year plans, Japan’s triple helix programs are undoubtedly the
most comprehensive among all the Asian developmental states.
3.5 Analysis and Discussion
Table 3.1 below summarizes the findings for the case studies. In general, the case studies provide
support for my assertion that as Asian developmental states move higher up the value chain, they
will engage in more intensive partnerships with businesses in order to spur innovation. In addition,
states that are very high up the GVC will move away from a simple bilateral government-industry
relationship to a complex triple helix connection involving the government, the industry and the
academy. Overall, while the case studies do not provide a perfect fit to my theory on GVC position
and corresponding triple helix configuration, no stark anomalies exist either.
Table 3.1: Summary of Findings from Case Studies
Country Stage of GVC Position Triple Helix Configuration
Economic Development (Independent Variable) (Dependent Variable)
Indonesia 1 Low Weak Triad
Philippines Transitioning from 1 to 2 Lower-Middle Weak Triad
Thailand Transitioning from 1 to 2 Lower-Middle Weak Triad
Malaysia 2 Middle Edge (bilateral G-I)*
Taiwan 4 Very High Strong Triad
South Korea 4 Very High Strong Triad
Singapore 4 Very High Strong Triad
Japan 4 Very High Strong Triad
*G-I refers to strong partnerships between the government and the industry. See Figure 3.1(ii).
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Confirming my earlier expectations, Indonesia, Philippines and Thailand all have weak trilateral
linkages, though Philippines and Thailand are positioned slightly higher than Indonesia on the GVC.
From table 3.1, Thailand and Philippines are already transitioning from low-tech manufacturing to
medium-tech manufacturing, resulting in a ‘lower-middle’ position in the GVC, but due to their
embryonic institutional frameworks and the lack of innovation demand, both bilateral and trilateral
relationships remain weak. Moreover, given widespread corruption and the lack of institutional
transparency, these states face considerable hurdles in establishing innovation partnerships.
Malaysia performed the best among the emerging Asian economies and serves as the intermediate
case in my analysis. To add, Malaysia is in an industrial transitional phase (stage 2) of medium-
tech manufacturing, which often requires collaboration between MNCs and local firms for some
technological diffusion to occur. As such, the Malaysian government establishes industrial clusters
and forge strong ties between government-linked corporations, local firms and MNCs. A robust
bilateral government-industry relationship is thus formed. However, given that the economy is still
medium-tech and the demand of skilled labor is not high (albeit increasing), the government may
not have the sense of urgency to establish strong relations with the university. Most resources are
still targeted at government-industry relations. Indeed, even though government-university relations
may improve, the relationship is likely to be in the nascent stages and remain weak. Similarly, due to
the lack of demand for skilled labor, the government is less inclined to tie the industry together with
universities. Consequently, as supported by the case of Malaysia, countries in stage 2 of economic
development will only have strong state-business relations.
The advanced Asian economies of Japan, South Korea, Singapore and Taiwan, which are
positioned very high up on the GVC all exhibit robust trilateral relations. This is consistent with what
was theorized earlier. Indeed, countries that have very high GVC positions are advanced economies
(stage 4) with both high-tech manufacturing and strong research and development demands. These
countries require constant product and process innovation in order to stay ahead of the curve. In
other words, countries at the apex of GVCs cannot merely be followers of technology – they must
innovate aggressively to continue growing and thriving. In addition, these countries face stiff global
competition from other advanced economies that may have a broader talent pool and more established
infrastructure. Moreover, as Wong (2011a) notes, countries which engage in high-end innovation
research such as biotechnology, nanotechnology, and robotics will need to manage high degrees of
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information uncertainty that may lead to innovation failure. Consequently, bilateral government-
industry and government-university innovation partnerships are not sufficient. The government needs
to step in to forge strong trilateral partnerships in order to reap greater synergistic effects that drive
knowledge and technological diffusion that in turn also helps to minimize uncertainty. A robust triple
helix would no doubt be required to sustain economic development for advanced Asian economies.
The high demand for innovation will drive these developmental states to forge or maintain a strong
trilateral relationship.
While the advanced Asian economies showed similar results, the emerging markets had greater
heterogeneity in their triple helix configurations. The case study analysis has managed to reveal
substantively why and how each case is the same or different from another, providing a richer context
to innovation partnership formation in Asian developmental states. Importantly, while I have shown
how innovation partnerships have evolved when a state moves up the GVC, I have yet to fully
explore evolutions beyond the strong triple helix model. That is, would a statist triple helix model
that is controlled by the government evolve to become a balanced model with all three actors on
equal footing? Would that be possible for the case of the Asian developmental state? My empirics
do not suggest this, but the time frame is too short to tell. An important implication is that if the
ultimate configuration is the balanced model, then would structural conditions finally render the
developmental state redundant past a certain stage of innovation? While this question is related to my
study of developmental states within the triple helix framework, it is beyond the scope of this paper.
3.6 Conclusion
This paper analyzes the evolution of state-business-university partnerships in Asian developmen-
tal states and provides some insights on what needs to be done in order for innovation to progress.
Indeed, the process of innovation is not confined within the industry. The government and the
academy also play critical roles. While a dynamic private sector alone may spur innovation, having
a robust trilateral government-industry-university relation is likely to result in virtuous cycles and
greater synergies. Developing economies that reach middle-income status may want to invest more
in their universities and encourage entrepreneurship among researchers under the auspices of the
government. Only through a persistent and sustained joint effort among the actors involved can the
economy realize its full potential.
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Future research may wish to investigate the evolution of the triple helix via social network
analysis (SNA). The triple helix presents a challenging but interesting model for SNA research:
(1) current SNA methods, especially statistical SNA such as the exponential random graph model
and the latent space model have not been calibrated to compute complex tripartite networks, and
(2) data for tripartite networks is severely lacking due to the complexity of relations both within a
single slice of network and between interlocking slices of networks. However, to fully understand
the dynamics of the triple helix and the critical factors that sustain it, we will ultimately need to
unpack and investigate the multidimensional relations between actors and between sets of actors that
constitute the triple helix.
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4 THE GREAT TRADE COLLAPSE: SHOCK AMPLIFIERS AND ABSORBERS
4.1 Introduction
Trade volumes all over the world experienced an unprecedented, sudden and synchronized drop
immediately following the global financial crisis of 2008. The drop in world trade was so severe that
it was faster than that observed during the Great Depression (Eichengreen and O’Rourke (2009)).
Moreover, the World Trade Organization (WTO) reported that the majority of countries in the world
experienced a drop in their exports and imports during the second half of 2008 (Baldwin (2009)).
Scholars have posited a number of factors attributing to the world trade collapse, from the global
credit crunch to fear and panic to trade protectionism, but perhaps the most significant factor that
is increasingly gaining attention is the emergence of global supply chains. As Barry Eichengreen
notes, “the most important factor [of the world trade collapse] is probably the growth of global supply
chains, which has magnified the impact of declining final demand on trade” (International-Economy
(2009)). In addition, Bems, Johnson and Yi (2009) assert that the “international supply chains are a
leading contender for explaining why the great collapse was so great”. Global supply chains matter
due to their complex production structures, with linkages that extend worldwide, making countries
much more interdependent than before.
Global production has undergone a radical evolution during the past few decades. Advances in
information and communications technology (ICT) coupled with WTO’s push for low trade barriers
have contributed to the emergence of fragmented production processes (or value chains) in world
trade, where production is no longer concentrated in one country but broken up and dispersed globally.
Moreover, the reorganization and dispersion of production processes imply that each production task
is now situated in the location with the highest comparative advantage (OECD (2013b)).
With production processes sub-divided into several stages across the world, many countries
became involved in production networks that each uses several intermediate inputs to produce a final
good to consumers. Moreover, Pitigala (2009) notes that emerging economies benefit considerably
from the development of GVCs, since these economies can participate in them easily and reap the
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gains of world trade. However, joining GVCs also expose these emerging economies to the risks of
economic shocks as economies (both emerging and advanced) become highly interdependent.
This study seeks to understand the mechanism of shock propagation through global production
networks. In particular, I examine the TV and communication equipment value chain (from 1996 to
2013), which is highly fragmented and dispersed internationally. I explore how shock propagation is
uneven throughout the value chain and discuss the implications. I argue that while the bullwhip effect
and complex network interdependencies magnify economic shocks throughout the supply chain, with
trade in intermediate goods being hurt more than trade in final goods, domestic political forces and
strong state capacity help to mitigate these shocks. In particular, the developmental state, a highly
interventionist state that actively promotes industrial policies and economic strategy, is significant in
countering the effects of an economic crisis. This paper investigates the effects of economic shock
propagation from both economic and political viewpoints. Moreover, I further extend my earlier
discussion on the developmental state to explore how these states are important in times of economic
crisis.
4.2 Economic Shock Amplifiers: Complex Interdependencies and the Bullwhip
International trade, which is the exchange of goods and services across borders, necessarily
entails connecting different countries in the world together in a complex network of economic
relations1. With increased liberalization of cross border transactions and the proliferation of supply
chains since the 1990s, countries are rapidly being embedded in global production networks. As such,
trade can no longer be viewed as merely bilateral, that is, trade between two countries is also affected
by other countries in the region and beyond. For instance, bilateral trade of TV and communication
goods between the US and China is likely to be dependent on bilateral trade between China and
Japan, as all three countries are involved in the same supply chain, albeit in different stages. The
US is likely to be the consumer country in this case2, while China is the country that assembles the
final good with intermediate products imported from Japan. Consequently, due to interdependencies
inherent in the world trade network, the transmission paths and feedback effects of an economic
1Of course, social (e.g. cultural exchanges) and political relations (e.g. diplomatic ties) may also result from trade
connections. But we focus on economic relations to make the analysis manageable.
2Or it could also be an innovator, depending on which specific product we are looking at within the TV and communi-
cation industry.
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crisis are often complex. Understanding the types of network connections and the topology of the
world trade network may shed more light on the propagation of economic crises.
The study of contagion effects via complex interdependencies is most prominent in the public
health scholarship, where researchers investigate the origins, patterns and consequences of disease
spread using social network analysis. Lessons drawn from the public health literature can sometimes
be applicable to our study of crisis propagation in economic networks. For instance, the heterogeneity
of degree distributions, which refer to the varying strength of connectedness among actors in the
network, as well as cluster coefficients, which measure the degree to which actors in the network tend
to cluster together, often point to the extent in which a disease can spread within the health-related
network, and can be applicable to economic networks as well.3 Indeed, a trade network that has
many tightly connected actors, as characterized by multiple or dense trade links among countries, is
likely to transmit economic shocks very quickly. Moreover, with the rise of tight regional production
networks that are linked to global ones, a crisis that occurs in the region might spread more quickly
within the cluster before spreading to other parts of the global network. In some cases, however,
depending on the patterns of connections and network topology, a crisis that occurs in a cluster might
not even spillover to become a global crisis (Oatley, Winecoff, Pennock and Danzman (2013)). For
instance, while the Asian Financial Crisis of 1997-98 had devastating impact on Southeast Asia,
and to some extent Northeast Asia, financial contagion was largely limited to the Asian countries as
strong clustering exists among them but they remain as semi-peripheral countries in the international
financial system (ibid). On the other hand, the US subprime crisis of 2007-08 had a devastating effect
on the vast majority of countries in the world, given that the US is the global finance hub.
How then might the world trade network perform differently from the global financial network?
A stark distinction is the presence of tight linkages that bind different regional clusters in the world
together due to the rise of global supply chains. In other words, a tightly clustered region (for example,
the phenomenon of ‘factory Asia’4) is also likely to be strongly connected to other regions in the
world. Consequently, shocks that occur in one regional cluster is likely to propagate throughout the
network, though the strength of shock propagation is uneven. Importantly, uneven shock propagation
does not mean that the economic shock will attenuate as it gets further from the center of the crisis –
3See May and Lloyd (2001), Moreno, Pastor-Satorras and Vespignani (2002), and Watts and Strogatz (1998)
4‘Factory Asia’ is a name given to describe the complex web of regional supply chains in Southeast and Northeast Asia.
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much depends on the country’s position in the supply chain.5 Moreover, due to the tightly connected
nature of clusters and complex interdependencies, a country that is recovering from an economic
crisis might still be highly susceptible due to contagion from its neighbors in the network.
Overall, the world trade network is likely to be densely connected and contain multiple connected
clusters that are highly susceptible to crisis contagion. In social network theory, graph density, which
is the ratio of the number of connections in the network to the maximum number of possible
connections, serves as a good predictor for shock propagation. Moreover, networks with multiple
tightly clustered or triadic relationships are likely to have economic shocks being circulated within
the cluster, making recovery from a crisis more difficult.6 I thus develop the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 1: The denser and more clustered7 the trade network, the greater the likelihood of
crisis contagion.8
4.2.1 The Bullwhip Effect: A Complexity Analysis of Economic Shock Propagation
While complex interdependencies in supply chains help to explain the spread of economic
shocks, the concept of interdependence alone does not fully explain the complex and unpredictable
impact of these shocks across the whole supply chain. Notably, as Zavacka (2012) notes, exporters
of intermediate goods were hurt much more than exporters of final goods during the recent trade
collapse, independent of network ties. Why is this so? Apart from network connections, what
accounts for uneven shock propagation in the supply chain? Studies have often failed to differentiate
the types of goods involved in international trade and assumes all trade is trade in final products for
consumption in the recipient country (ibid). However, with greater fragmentation of world trade, this
assumption is increasingly erroneous as the intermediate trade network performs very differently
from the trade network in final products during an economic crisis.
5In some cases, shocks can even get magnified further away from the crisis epicenter. This phenomenon relates to the
bullwhip effect, which will be described in the next section.
6Other types of configurations such as k-cycles can also serve as a proxy to model network clusters, but in general, a
triad serves as the simplest form of cluster relations in the network and can be used to generalize other types of clusters.
Notably, a 3-cycle is a triad. The closed triad is often used in the calculation of clustering coefficients (see Lusher, Koskinen
and Robins (2014)).
7Network density and clustering are somewhat related. A very dense network is likely to have many clusters. However,
a sparse network is less dense, but multiple local clusters may still exist. In general, density relates more to network
connections, while clusters (or clustering triads) reflect more of network topology. This hypothesis is thus contingent on 2
conditions (1) density and (2) clustering of a network. Twining these two conditions together will allow more feasible
testing of this hypothesis as the actual networks that are dense are also highly clustered, while sparser networks are less
clustered, according to my data on TV and communication GVC. More will be explained in the later sections.
8Trade network here refers to either trade in intermediate or final goods. This paper will explore both types of goods.
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One major mechanism that is useful in analyzing shock propagation is the ‘bullwhip effect’
(Altomonte, Di Mauro, Ottaviano, Rungi and Vicard (2012), and Zavacka (2012)).9 The bullwhip
effect refers to “the magnification of the initial (negative) demand shock along the supply chain
due to an adjustment of production and stocks [or inventories] to the new expected levels of output”
(Altomonte et al. (2012)). In the case of the recent financial crisis, the negative demand shock is the
result of the credit crunch and low business (and consumer) sentiments. Consequently, firms needed
to tone down their output as well as clear their existing inventories. Moreover, the clearing of existing
inventories by firms downstream (final goods) caused firms upstream (intermediate goods) to face an
even larger reduction in demand. As such, demand distortions ripple and amplify throughout the
supply chain, hitting producers that are further upstream the hardest.
In addition, due to the high degree of uncertainty in an economic crisis and the lack of com-
munication between upstream and downstream suppliers, upstream suppliers often need to cut their
production more rapidly than if they had more information, in order to protect themselves from
excess capacity. As a result, trade in intermediate goods will fall more rapidly than trade in final
products. As Cachon and Terwiesch (2011) note, the bullwhip effect increases volatility in supply
chains and may lead to product shortages, low utilization of capacity, and/or poor quality of goods
as a result of hasty production when the upstream producer discovers that demand is not actually
that low. To make things worse, the bullwhip effect creates a vicious feedback cycle that indirectly
affects downstream producers as well, which must “cope with less reliable replenishments from
upstream stages” (ibid). Consequently, the bullwhip effect explains the complex dynamics between
the intermediate and final trade networks during an economic crisis.
4.2.2 Variations in the Length of GVCs
Not all production networks are fragmented and dispersed in the same way. For instance, an
agricultural GVC is likely to be concentrated domestically while an electronics GVC would be more
dispersed internationally due to the many product parts involved. Consequently, the length of GVCs
may determine the amount of shock amplification in the supply chain due to the bullwhip effect:
longer GVCs should be more susceptible to the harmful effects of the bullwhip as more stages and
actors are involved. Indeed, the existing literature reveals strong bullwhip effects in the automobile
9Also see Escaith and Gonguet (2009), Escaith, Lindenburg and Miroudot (2010), Ma and Van Assche (2011), Lee,
Padmanabhan and Wang (1997), and Cachon, Randall and Schmidt (2007).
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and retail industries, which have long chains (Chen and Lee (2012)). Figure 4.1 below shows the
length of GVCs for various industries in 2008.
Figure 4.1: GVC Length Variation in 2008 (adopted from OECD (2012))
From the graph, we see that the TV and communication equipment industry has the longest
GVC length. In addition, this industry is also the most dispersed internationally. In general, the
manufacturing industries have longer value chains compared to the service industries (for example,
education, health and social, and finance and social insurance industries). Moreover, service industries
are also more concentrated domestically. Indeed, the service industry serves to provide support for
consumers (for example after-sales service and healthcare service) and thus needs to be predominantly
domestic and less fragmented to ensure smooth support functions.
In order to more fully investigate the bullwhip effect, I base this paper on the TV and com-
munication equipment industry as it has the most fragmented and dispersed value chain. Indeed,
substantial sectoral and regional variation exist in GVCs. Not controlling for these variations may
lead to erroneous findings. I thus develop my second hypothesis:
Hypothesis 2: Following an economic crisis, exports in intermediate goods (upstream) will
decrease more than exports in final goods (downstream) in the TV and communication equipment
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industry. In other words, an economic shock will have more impact on intermediate goods than final
goods.
The above hypothesis has serious implications for economic development in emerging economies
that are engaged in the TV and communication equipment industry. Emerging economies join GVCs
because they are easy to join, but when crisis strikes, emerging economies will also be hard hit due
to the bullwhip effect. Indeed, Inomata (2011) notes that emerging Asian countries that engage
heavily in the production of intermediate electronics goods were severely affected when American
and European consumers cut down on demand during the recent financial crisis.
4.3 Shock Absorbers: State Capacity and the Developmental State
The global financial crisis of 2007-08 has led some scholars to question the taboo of state
intervention in economics, and to argue that the state is actually a prominent actor in mitigating
crises.10 In addition, even the OECD, a pro-market intergovernmental organization, has published a
report urging governments to take a more active role in industrial restructuring and policy making
after the crisis (OECD (2009)). Indeed, when severe market distortions exist and the invisible
hand fails to deliver, the state must step in to reduce the risks of market collapse in their respective
economies. States can thus act as shock absorbers that mitigate the risks of a crisis through an
array of policy measures. In general, while particular policy instruments differ from state to state,
governments that are transparent and bureaucratically efficient are likely to perform better during
a crisis as urgent policies would not be hindered too much by organizational and political forces.
The ability of governments to respond quickly to devise and implement both short and long term
policies is critical to manage crises as they unfold (UNDP (2011)). Three general state capacity
variables are discussed: (1) government effectiveness in the civil service, (2) regulatory regime, and
(3) transparency and accountability.11
A country’s civil service is perhaps the most important institution that is mobilized during a
crisis (ibid). In times of crisis, the civil service helps to set up task forces that engage in monitoring
and evaluation to inform policy making and economic strategy. Moreover, the effectiveness of a
country’s policy coordination, public finance management. budget planning and execution as well as
the delivery of public goods all depend on its civil service (ibid). When resources dwindle during
10See for instance Cimoli, Dosi and Stiglitz (2009).
11I will extend and carry on this discussion to talk about the developmental states in the section below.
67
an economic crisis, the effectiveness of policy management and coordination becomes even more
salient. Indeed, a strong and robust civil service is critical to not only prevent wastage of a country’s
economic resources, but also ensures that a country recovers as quickly as possible from a crisis.
Citing examples of Mauritius and United Republic of Tanzania, a report from the UNDP notes that
countries that have well institutionalized mechanisms for policy development are able to cope better
during the recent economic crisis (ibid). On the other hand, the lack of a coherent, predictable and
functioning bureaucracy will be detrimental to a country’s ability to respond to crises (Evans (2010)).
Besides bureaucratic effectiveness, a country’s regulatory regime is also important to dampen
the effects of external economic shocks. Negative demand shocks and the bullwhip effect during
a crisis might dampen business sentiments and industrial production. However, robust regulatory
regimes that are active in promoting private sector development can help to increase business activity,
offsetting to a certain extent the effects of an economic crisis. Furthermore, highly institutionalized
regulatory frameworks help to instill a sense of confidence in the country’s economy, which may in
turn attract investors that are pulling out of other countries.
Transparency and accountability may also help to mitigate a crisis. Both of these factors help
to heighten a sense of public confidence (which may be low during a crisis) in the government’s
management of the country. Businesses operating under transparent and accountable countries may
have higher business sentiment and greater trust in the system. Conversely, corrupt regimes often
perform poorly during a crisis as the government’s coffer dries up. With the discussion on state
capacity, I thus develop the following hypotheses:
Hypotheses 3a-c: The greater the (a) government’s effectiveness in its civil service, (b) insti-
tutionalization of regulatory regime, or (c) transparency within the government, the stronger the
mitigation of economic shocks during an economic crisis.
4.3.1 The Developmental State and Crisis Mitigation
Extending the discussion above, developmental states are a unique breed of countries that have
high state capacity. More precisely, developmental states are highly interventionist states that engage
in industrial policy for economic growth. As Evans (1995) notes, developmental states have both
strong state capacity and the political will to carry out reforms. Consequently, during an economic
crisis, developmental states not only have the institutional framework and capacity to counteract the
pressures of economic shocks, but also the political will to carry out painful reforms if necessary.
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Meyns and Musamba (2010) identify three defining features of the developmental state that
are critical to economic crisis management: (1) an autonomous and effective bureaucracy, (2)
competitive and production-oriented private sector, and (3) development-oriented political leadership.
As discussed above, an effective and efficient bureaucracy is important to help the country tide over
a crisis. Developmental states boasts outstanding bureaucracies, with rigorous standards of civil
service entry that select some of the best talent available in the country (Onis (1991)). Moreover,
developmental states exhibit a rare form of administrative management that is highly focused
on economic growth. Bureaucrats not only create highly institutionalized economic frameworks
and regulatory regimes, they are also active in forging state-business partnerships. As Meyns and
Musamba (2010) note, “decision-makers and technocrats were able to effectively formulate economic
policy, forge business alliances and direct state interventions in the economy” (p.23, also see Nissanke
and Aryeetey (2003) and Pempel (1999)). Moreover, in times of crisis, state-business partnerships
may help to provide bureaucrats with necessary information in the private sector, making economic
reforms and restructuring more relevant, and increasing the chances of crisis recovery.
Although the private sector is closely tied to the bureaucracy, businesses are frequently held up
to stringent performance standards. For instance, Wade (1990) and Amsden (1989) note that the state
was “not only able to secure the survival and ability of the private sector to compete at any level,
but, more crucially, was able to “create” and “reward” in addition to “picking” good performers, as
well as “punishing” bad ones”.12 Firms within developmental states need to perform well or they
risk having their subsidies or other incentives revoked by the government. The exposure to tough
standards and the global market forces firms to develop highly organized and systematic structures
that may help to counter economic crises.
Apart from having a robust state capacity, developmental states have a political leadership that
is heavily focused on economic growth. Indeed, the political will of developmental states should
make crisis management more efficient, all other things held constant. The willingness to reform and
restructure the economy for developmental outcomes or long term stability will make the country
more resilient to economic crises. Moreover, having a strong political will to carry out painful but
necessary reforms may help a country recover from a crisis more quickly.
12Cited in Meyns and Musamba (2010)
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Hypothesis 4: A developmental state is more likely to mitigate the effects of an economic crisis
compared to a non-developmental one, all other things held constant.
4.4 Data
As discussed in earlier sections, I will conduct my empirical analysis on the TV and communica-
tion equipment GVC from 1996 to 2013, considering exports of both intermediate and final goods.
Data is drawn from the OECD Structural Analysis (STAN) Bilateral Trade Database (ISIC Rev. 3).
In addition, the three state capacity variables13 (1) government effectiveness in civil service, (2)
regulatory quality, and (3) transparency are obtained from the World Bank’s World Governance Indi-
cators. The developmental state binary variable is constructed similar to paper 1, with ‘1’ signifying
that the exporter is a developmental state and ‘0’ otherwise.14 In addition, I explore three economic
crises in my dataset: (1) Asian Financial Crisis 1997, (2) Dotcom bubble 2000, and (3) US subprime
crisis 2007-08. The crisis variable is constructed as a binary variable with ‘1’ indicating a crisis
occurred during that year and ‘0’ otherwise. Altogether, the dataset contains 59,508 observations.15
Two main statistical network models16 are run to assess the importance of economic crises
on exports in intermediate and final goods respectively.17 State capacity and developmental state
variables will be also interacted with the crisis variable to test whether or not (and to what extent)
these variables mitigate an economic crisis. The main dependent variables are (1) intermediate trade
exports, and (2) final trade exports, while the main independent variables are Crisis, (Gov18 x Crisis),
(Regulatory Quality x Crisis), (Transparency x Crisis), and (Developmental State x Crisis).
Control variables used in this study include GDP, Trade openness, Democracy Dyad and Lagged
Export. GDP measures the market size of a country, and data are obtained from the World Bank.
Trade openness is measured as a country’s total gross trade divided by its GDP and the data is also
13As a note, the state capacity variables are in the range -2.5 to 2.5, with 2.5 indicating the highest level of state capacity.
For the purposes of network analysis and tie connection, I add each of the state capacity variable to the absolute of the
minimum value of each variable, making the minimum value non-negative across the variables.
14Consistent with paper 1, the developmental states are Japan, South Korea, Singapore, Taiwan, Malaysia, Thailand,
Philippines, Vietnam and Indonesia.
15This is across 18 years (1996 to 2013) for 58 countries.
16More will be explained in the methods section below. Also, note that the networks are directed as the main dependent
variables are exports.
17This is to gauge for the bullwhip effect. That is, I expect to see the crisis variable to be more salient in the intermediate
goods model compared to the final goods model.
18Refers to government effectiveness in civil service.
70
from the World Bank. Democracy Dyad is the polity IV score of the dyad. Lagged Export is the
export (intermediate or final export, depending on the model) lagged by one year.
4.5 Methods
Due to the computational complexity in this paper, I use two types of quantitative methods to
assess my claims: (1) Agent-based Model (ABM), and (2) Temporal Exponential Random Graph
Model (TERGM). These two models represent the most current technology in assessing complex
network effects and dynamics. Below I give a brief description of each model:
4.5.1 Agent-based Model
Agent-based modeling is a class of computational modeling method that can simulate complex
interactions and network effects described in hypothesis 1. Importantly, ABM can account for
feedback effects that are not captured in statistical analysis. In addition, ABM allows agents to
interact in non-linear ways and is useful to explore emergent behaviors, which are properties of the
system that can only be understood by viewing the system as a whole and cannot be gleaned just by
looking at individual components or parts. Overall, ABM provides a dynamic modeling platform for
my exploration of trade network complexity. I use the Netlogo program, developed by Uri Wilensky,
for my ABM simulations. Results are reported and discussed in the later sections.
4.5.2 Temporal Exponential Random Graph Model
The TERGM is the temporal extension of the Exponential Random Graph Model, which is an
advanced statistical method that analyzes social network data. The TERGM allows me to obtain
statistical results from the data while controlling for complex interdependencies and accounting for
endogenous network structures such as triadic closures, in/out-2-star and mixed-2-star effects.19 As
Cranmer, Desmarais and Menninga (2012) note, not accounting for endogenous network statistics
may lead to the problem of omitted variable bias, which can render our statistical results unreliable.
19An “in-2-star” effect refers to two nodes having directed connections to the same third node, but those two nodes
are not connected to one another. Substantively, this means that two countries are exporters to a popular third country
(popularity effects) but the two countries do not trade among themselves. An “out-2-star” refers to a country that exports
extensively to other countries, engaging in a lot of export activities, but those countries that it exports to do not trade with
each other. A mixed-2-star is a directed path of length 2 from node i to k via j. Also, the triadic closure here refers to a
transitive triple, which is made up of a out-2-star with a directed tie established among the two originally unconnected
nodes. A transitive triple can indicate clustering in the network.
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4.5.3 Thresholding and Creating the Dependent Variable
While the TERGM is a powerful statistical network method, it is limited by its binary dependent
variable input.20 Thus, in order to use the TERGM, I need to transform my dependent variables into
binary forms. In order to convert the weighted dependent variables to a binary ones, we need to first
assign a threshold or cut-point. Subsequently, any export volume that has a value at or more than
the threshold will be assigned ‘1’, and those values below the threshold will be assigned ‘0’. As
Cranmer and Desmarais (2011) note, the cut-point is quite arbitrary, with different scholars adopting
different criteria. However, percentage thresholds, due to their flexibility, are likely to be more
accurate compared to absolute ones. Fortunately for the case of trade networks, econo-physicists21
have recommended three distinct thresholds: 0%, 1%, and 2%. Notably, a 0% threshold just indicates
the mere existence of trade among two countries and hence it is the least restrictive threshold that
is not usually the best. Moreover, a 0% threshold would mean that an export of 1 million dollars
becomes equivalent to an export of 10 dollars, since both would now constitute a tie of value ‘1’ in
the network.
In order to thin my network more and to ensure that only substantial ties are counted, I use
a 2% threshold. To add, Kali and Reyes (2010) note that the 1 or 2% thresholds “are close to
embodying meaningful or representative trade” (p.1085). I thus select the higher threshold for
greater robustness.22 Figures A.1 and A.2 in the appendix show the intermediate and final network
visualization corresponding to the different thresholds (1% and 2%) as well as the respective
degree distributions of actors in the network; figures A.3 and A.4 shows an enlarged version of the
intermediate and final trade networks at 2% threshold in 201323:
Formally, letting yijt to represent my outcome variable (intermediate or final exports), I have:
yijt =
8<: 1 if exports, Eijt   2% of total exports of the exporter in a given year t0 otherwise
20Software development of a valued-edge ERGM or GERGM (Generalized Exponential Random Graph Model)
is underway. Another method that can model valued edges is the Latent Space Model, but this model is limited to
cross-sectional analysis and does not allow users to model time-series data.
21Econo-physicists are interdisciplinary scholars who apply methods in physics to the study of economic phenomena.
22To ensure greater validity of results, I conduct tests using 1% and 2% thresholds and found that the results were largely
similar.
23This is just a sample year for the illustration of thresholding effects.
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4.6 TERGM Results and Analysis
Six separate models were run. Models 1 and 2 are the TERGM intermediate export models
based on the 2% and 1% thresholds respectively, while models 3 and 4 are the corresponding models
in the export of final goods. Models 5 and 6 are additional robustness test models (TERGM at 2%
threshold) based on the 2007-08 financial crisis.
Maximum Pseudo Likelihood (MPL) is used to produce consistent estimates of the parameters.
In addition, the computational tractability of the pseudo-likelihood function makes it a very attractive
alternative to the common full likelihood function. As Cranmer and Desmarais (2011) note, “the
computational burden associated with the use of MCMC-MLE is insurmountable given current
technology” (p.81). Besides using the MPL method, I also implement a bootstrap resampling method
for computing the 95% confidence intervals. 1000 bootstrap iterations are used in each of my
TERGM models and the respective confidence intervals are calculated using the 2.5th and 97.5th
percentiles of the sample of bootstrap estimates. Results for my main independent variables are
reported in tables 4.1 and A.2. The full TERGM results are reported in the appendix.
From table 4.1 below, the Crisis variable is negative and statistically significant at the 0.05
level for both models 1 and 2. On the other hand, we find no conclusive statistical evidence for
Crisis dampening exports in final products (models 3 and 4). At first glance, this may seem to be
a verification of the bullwhip effect, as economic crisis hurts intermediate exports more than final
exports. However, given that Crisis is conditional on the various state capacity variables and whether
or not the exporter is a developmental state, the main effect of Crisis is only suitable for direct
inference when the state capacity variables tend to zero and when the exporter is not a developmental
state. Notably, all the interaction terms will be eliminated when state capacity scores are zero and
when the exporter is not a developmental state. Inspecting the data, a zero state capacity score is
possible, with countries like Myanmar, Cambodia and Bangladesh having zero or near zero state
capacity scores. Overall, a substantive interpretation of Crisis is that an economic crisis decreases
the odds of intermediate exports by 50.68% on average for only very weak non-developmental states,
conditional on the rest of the intermediate trade network at the 2% threshold.24
24The substantive importance of the crisis variable in the 1% intermediate trade network is not computed here as my
main model is model 1. Model 2 is just to compare the similarity of results in the main independent variables.
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Table 4.1: Partial TERGM Results for Intermediate and Final Networks (1996-2013)
Model 1 (2%) Model 2 (1%) Model 3 (2%) Model 4 (1%)
Crisis -0.410⇤ -0.463⇤ 0.181 0.487
[-1.140, -0.000] [-0.905, -0.024] [-3.668, 4.701] [-1.971, 3.757]
Developmental State x Crisis 0.023 0.004 -0.256 -0.132
[-0.158, 0.220] [-0.135, 0.193] [-0.476, 0.242] [-0.400, 0.533]
Government x Crisis -0.017 0.137 0.806 1.003
[-0.248, 0.164] [-0.208, 0.332] [-0.276, 1.638] [-0.076, 1.757]
Regulatory Quality x Crisis 0.128 0.020 0.045 0.015
[-0.092, 0.455] [-0.216, 0.283] [-1.220, 0.599] [-0.678, 0.475]
Transparency x Crisis -0.020 -0.062 0.729 -0.918
[-0.175, 0.109] [-0.149, 0.087] [-1.393, 0.332] [-1.582, 0.053]
Developmental State (Exporter) 0.369⇤ 0.543⇤ 0.067 0.118
[0.245, 0.495] [0.419, 0.695] [-0.140, 0.345] [-0.032, 0.326]
Developmental State (Importer) -0.720⇤ -0.689⇤ -0.938⇤ -0.899⇤
[-0.821, -0.614] [-0.775, -0.601] [-1.289, -0.548] [-1.487, -0.374]
Government -0.002 0.039 -0.274 -0.022
[-0.119, 0.109] [-0.101, 0.173] [-0.937, 0.374] [-0.841, 0.337]
Regulatory Quality -0.106 -0.091 0.207 0.184
[-0.236, 0.024] [-0.244, 0.082] [-0.027, 0.481] [-0.105, 0.515]
Transparency 0.132 0.125⇤ -0.026 0.065
[-0.002, 0.271] [0.028, 0.239] [-0.491, 0.418] [-0.369, 0.504]
Triadic Closure/Transitivity 0.446⇤ 0.456⇤ 0.552⇤ 0.758⇤
[0.354, 0.540] [0.299, 0.642] [0.407, 0.656] [0.306, 1.176]
⇤p<0.05. Models 1-4 show the TERGM estimates given in the columns with 95% confidence
intervals in the brackets. Confidence intervals not containing zero are statistically significant at
the 0.05 level. N = 59,508.
In addition, it is noteworthy to point out that scholars exploring the bullwhip effect have often
omitted the effects of government institutions25, assuming that states do not intervene in economic
affairs or that those interventions are futile. This is analogous to the special case in my model
where we consider a group of very weak and non-developmental states.26 Thus, results from my
statistical models still point to the bullwhip effect, but caution that reality is made more complex
via government involvement in the economy during a crisis. For the majority of cases, I found no
conclusive evidence for the bullwhip effect in the TV and communication industry after accounting
for state capacity variables. Indeed, some recent studies on the bullwhip effect have also noted the
absence and variation of the bullwhip across industries. For instance, Cachon, Randall and Schmidt
25See Lee, Padmanabhan and Wang (1997), Altomonte et al. (2012), and Zavacka (2012).
26In this case, the states do not have sufficient capacity to intervene.
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(2007) note that the bullwhip effect is often contested in empirical studies and may not be evident
from industry-level data. In fact, the authors even found contrary evidence to the bullwhip effect,
with retail demand more volatile than manufacturing demand. Consequently, the partial confirmation
of the bullwhip effect in my results point to more interesting and complex dynamics that involve the
simultaneous interplay of shock amplifiers and absorbers.
Although not directly related to the hypotheses of this paper, I find evidence of developmental
states as export enhancers in the intermediate trade network of TV and communication equipment.
From model 1, the odds of establishing an export relation is increased by 44.63% on average, if
the country is a developmental state and when no economic crisis occurs. This relationship is also
reflected in model 2, with a larger percentage increase of 72.12%, due to the denser network. However,
no conclusive statistical evidence is derived from exports in final products at both 2% and 1% levels.
This may be due to the fact that developmental states are much more embedded in intermediate than
final goods exports. Indeed, my results provide evidence to the ‘Factory Asia’ phenomenon, where
Northeast and Southeast Asian countries, many of them being developmental states, are heavily
engaged in intermediate goods manufacturing. In addition, if a country is a developmental state, then
the odds of establishing an import relationship with another country will decrease, in the absence
of an economic crisis. This result is consistent across all four models. For my main models (2%
threshold), being a developmental state will decrease the odds of intermediate and final imports by
51.32% and 60.86% respectively on average, when no crisis occurs. Substantively, developmental
states are production-oriented states that aim to gain economic growth and competitiveness through
exports, and hence may not favor imports that hurt trade surpluses. Moreover, a number of the
developmental states in the dataset are electronics powerhouses (e.g. South Korea, Taiwan, Japan
and Singapore) that are likely to export TV and communication with high domestic content.
In terms of the endogenous covariates, the most important variable is Triadic Closure/Transi-
tivity, as it relates to the propensity of the network to cluster.27 Across all four models, Triadic
Closure/Transitivity is positive and statistically significant at the 0.05 level. Moreover, models 3 and
27The 2-star covariates are all negative and statistically significant at the 0.05 level, indicating that these network
configurations are unlikely to exist in both the intermediate and final trade networks. The in/out-degree measures serve as
indication for highly connected or centralized nodes, and we find that highly centralized nodes are likely to be present in
all the four models. Edges are similar to the y-intercept in linear regression. Substantively, the edges variable is irrelevant
here as some of the covariates such as GDP and trade openness cannot be zero.
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4 show higher coefficient estimates for triadic closure compared to models 1 and 2, indicating that
clustering is more likely in the final trade network. As hypothesis 1 posits, the higher the clustering
within the network, the greater the crisis contagion.28 Indeed, my statistical results point to a more
susceptible final trade network to economic crisis contagion. Notably, this is not to say that the final
trade network would be hit harder by the crisis compared to the intermediate trade network. As
discussed in the earlier paragraphs, the impact of crisis is more severe on weak non-developmental
states in the intermediate trade network. For other states in the international system, we cannot
conclude whether the crisis hits intermediate or final trade harder.
4.6.1 TERGM Results Robustness Check
As my interaction variables in models 1 through 4 are not statistically significant, I am unable to
confirm the hypotheses on the importance of state capacity and the developmental state in mitigating
economic crises. Importantly, treating all crises as the same might not be very accurate. In fact, out of
the three crises coded in my data, the recent global financial meltdown has the most widespread and
destructive consequences, which led to the ‘great trade collapse’ as described earlier (Eichengreen
and O’Rourke (2009)). Consequently, in order to explore hypotheses 3 and 4 further, I run two
additional models that focus solely on the recent global financial crisis. Models 5 and 6 below
represent the intermediate and final export networks at the 2% threshold:
Table 4.2: Partial TERGM Results for Intermediate and Final Networks (2007-08)
Model 5 (intermediate 2%) Model 6 (final 2%)
Developmental State (Exporter) 0.135⇤ -0.032
[0.090, 0.174] [-0.032, 0.506]
Developmental State (Importer) -0.563⇤ -0.798⇤
[-0.699, -0.471] [-9.388, -0.675]
Government 0.010 0.270⇤
[-0.021, 0.028] [0.270, 0.582]
Regulatory Quality 0.072 -0.179
[-0.070, 0.151] [-0.179, 0.701]
Transparency -0.014 -0.070
[-0.071, 0.089] [-0.368, 0.070]
⇤p<0.05. Models 5 & 6 show the TERGM estimates given in the columns with 95%
confidence intervals in the brackets. Confidence intervals not containing zero are
statistically significant at the 0.05 level. N = 6612. Note that some of the estimates
are near or on the confidence interval boundaries due to rounding off to 3 decimal places.
28This claim will be assessed via agent-based modeling in the next section.
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From Model 5, we see that despite a crisis situation, developmental states still have a positive
impact on exports in intermediate TV and communication equipment. Substantively, if a country is a
developmental state, it will increase the odds of establishing export relations with another country
by 14.45% on average, conditional on the rest of the network. However, this percentage increase is
lower than the 44.63% for the full model, indicating that the financial crisis might have dampened
the propensity and capacity to trade to some extent. Nonetheless, the statistical significance of the
developmental state (exporter) variable points to the salience of developmental states in pushing
for intermediate goods exports and managing the crisis. Inconclusive evidence remain for the three
general state capacity variables.
Model 6, on the other hand, presents a different set of results: the developmental state (exporter)
variable is not statistically significant at the 0.05 level, but government effectiveness (Government)
is positive and statistically significant. As discussed earlier, developmental states are usually more
actively involved in intermediate rather than final goods exports, consistent with the ‘Factory Asia’
phenomenon. The government effectiveness variable, however, is more interesting here because it
points to the importance of the civil service in times of crisis. From the results, a 1-unit increase in
the government effectiveness score of a country increases the odds of establishing export relations in
final products with another country by 31.00%. In addition, since countries that export final goods
in TV and communication equipment are likely to be emerging markets that assemble intermediate
products to make the final good, a strong civil service is necessary to formulate and implement
economic strategies that facilitate exports during a crisis. This echoes a UNDP report that highlights
the importance of a highly institutionalized civil service in developing countries to help manage a
crisis more efficiently (UNDP (2011)). Overall, model 6 provides support for hypothesis 3a.
4.6.2 TERGM Goodness-of-Fit Tests
Given that the TERGM is estimated using a bootstrap pseudo-likelihood method, it does not
provide straightforward model fit statistics such as the AIC, BIC, or R2 that are commonly seen
in traditional regression analysis. Instead, simulated networks, which are based on the parameters
estimated in the models, are compared to observed networks to compute the goodness-of-fit (Cranmer,
Desmarais and Menninga (2012)). I thus conduct robustness tests on my main models (with 2%
threshold). The goodness-of-fit plots for each model are shown in the appendix.
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In general, a model is a good fit if the medians of the box plots, which are based on simulated
networks, come close to the line that plots the values in the observed network. As Lusher, Koskinen
and Robins (2014) note, the goodness-of-fit for exponential random graph models allow us to “know
whether the specified model for our observed data represents particular network structures or graph
features well” (p.179). Importantly, the goodness-of-fit plots of the TERGM focuses on model fit with
regards to network topology. From figure A.5, we see that on four of seven plots, the intermediate
export model (1996-2013) fits very well. However, the model does not perform as well for the in-
and out-star distributions as well as the geodesic distribution plots. On the other, from figure A.6,
the final export model (1996-2013) performs much better for most the network structural types,
but the out-star plot is still lacking. For the networks that look at the recent global financial crisis
(figures A.7 and A.8), similar patterns of fit can be seen, though the edge-wise shared partners plots
performed slightly worse than the full models. Importantly, while the models fit well on certain
network structural types, they fall short on other topologies. What could then be said of the overall
fit of the respective models?
In order to further investigate model fit, I use the Receiver Operator Characteric (ROC) curve
that allows me to assess the in-sample predictive performance of the models.29 Indeed, the ROC
goes beyond network topologies to assess model fit. The ROC curve plots the rate of true positive
predictions against the rate of false positive predictions. In our context, true positives are those
states predicted to establish export ties under certain conditions in the model which actually go on
to export in reality (as backed by the data provided). On the other hand, false positives are those
states predicted to establish export relations but do not actually do that. As such, a model that gives
results of pure chance would produce a diagonal ROC plot. Moreover, as Cranmer and Desmarais
(2011) note, the resulting area under the ROC curve, called the AUC, gives the “integrated difference
between the predictive success and predictive error of a classifier, and represents a scalar-valued
measure of model fit” (p.83). Indeed, an ROC curve that is a diagonal straight line is produced
by chance and has an AUC of 0.5, whereas a perfectly predictive model will have an AUC of 1
29Other papers such as Cranmer and Desmarais (2011) and Saul and Filkov (2007) also use the ROC to assess predictive
performance of exponential random graph models.
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(Kemshall and Wilkinson (2011)). As a yardstick, models with AUCs greater than 0.6 are suitable to
be used in research (ibid).30
From figures A.9 and A.10 in the appendix, we see that all the main models have AUCs greater
than 0.8, indicating very good predictive performance of the models. In fact, the AUC for the
intermediate exports full model (see figure A.9(a)) has a very high value of 0.9246985.31 Overall,
the AUC values provide confidence in the TERGM results.
4.7 Complementing the TERGM: Using ABM in Modeling Shock Propagation
Although the TERGM is a powerful method to account for complex interdependencies and
endogenous effects, it cannot simulate the dynamics of economic shocks. Neither can the TERGM
account for feedback effects that are inherent during a crisis. For instance, a country that is recovering
from a crisis is still very weak and highly susceptible to further shocks that might pull it down again.
ABM allows interactions among multiple agents to take place simultaneously, with simulations
that model the complexity of economic relations and shock propagation. I use the ABM to to test
hypothesis 1 to see whether a dense and highly clustered network would lead to greater chance of
crisis contagion and slower recovery time.
I conduct my investigation on economic shock propagation on the 2008 intermediate and final
trade networks, as 2008 marked the start of the great trade collapse, with full effects manifested later
that year. While most ABM models only provide abstractions of reality by simulating computer-
generated networks, I input real data into my simulations to make results more realistic. Besides
feeding in real export data to form my networks, I used state capacity variables to help determine the
recovery chance from a crisis. Indeed, countries that have high state capacity and/or are development
states might be able to implement policy measures and economic strategy more quickly to lift the
country out of crisis.32 In addition, states that export to multiple export markets (high out-degree
centrality) are also less likely to be affected by the crisis if only a few of their export destinations are
30Of course, the closer the AUC is to 1, the better the model fit.
31The TERGM goodness-of-fit test computes the AUC for each year in the model. The final AUC value of each model
is thus the mean of AUCs across all years considered in the model.
32Note that I also consider states with strong capacity and/or developmental states to have increased chance of non-
contagion, especially states encounter a minor regional crisis occurs. However, this consideration is not applicable in this
case given the severity of the US subprime crisis. The function was added in my model for future reference.
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crisis-struck.33 On the other hand, having connected to multiple markets can be disadvantageous if
the majority of those markets are crisis-laden. I thus run my models based on these considerations,
with the results shown below34.
Given that the financial crisis started in the US, my networks begin with the US as the crisis node.
I then explore how the crisis is spread throughout the network, noting the time taken (or number of
‘ticks’ in Netlogo) for the whole network to stabilize with no nodes in crisis. Importantly, the graph
density and clustering coefficient for the intermediate export network is 0.2447066 and 0.5032473
respectively, while those of the final export network are 0.3021779 and 0.5917315, indicating that the
final trade network is more dense and clustered under the 2% threshold.35 To note, a larger clustering
coefficient and graph density point to the propensity for crisis spread (as described in hypothesis
1) but is not indicative of crisis impact.36 From figure 4.2, we see that although the networks have
recovered (i.e. no crisis nodes), a large proportion of countries are still highly susceptible (shown by
the orange line), with a smaller percentage resistant to falling back into crisis (blue line). Moreover,
the final export network progression plot in figure 4.2(b) resulted in a higher percentage of countries
susceptible to crisis even after the network has stabilized with no crisis node left. The gap between
resistant countries and susceptible ones is also greater than that of the intermediate export network’s.
Importantly, the time taken for the intermediate trade network to stabilize is approximately 1104.66
ticks on average based on 100 simulations on Netlogo’s BehaviorSpace, while the final trade network
takes about 1351.68 ticks.37 Overall, my models provide evidence to hypothesis 1, asserting that
networks with higher density and clustering coefficient will be more susceptible to crisis contagion.
33As my networks have already been thinned to reflect the 2% threshold, I treat all remaining connection ties to be
substantial and equally likely in transmitting a crisis. The networks used here are the directed (but unweighted) networks
used in my TERGM models.
34My ABMmodel modifies the “Virus in a Network” model to suit the context of this paper. See Stonedahl and Wilensky
(2008) for the original model.
35In general, figures A.11 and A.12 in the appendix depict the full network of the respective Netlogo runs for reference
purposes.
36Assessments of crisis impact are shown in my TERGM models instead.
37Note that this has nothing to do with the bullwhip effect as I am modeling the networks separately and Netlogo
treats these two networks as distinct entities. The lack of available data makes combining the intermediate and final trade
networks into a multiplex network difficult. Moreover, Netlogo does not allow the formation of multiple edges between a
pair of nodes.
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Figure 4.2: Crisis Simulation for Intermediate and Final Export Networks (2%)
(a) Progression Plot (Intermediate Export Network)
(b) Progression Plot (Final Export Network)
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4.8 Conclusion
This paper points to the significance of complex interdependencies and network topology in
shock propagation during an economic crisis. Besides shock amplifiers that relate to the structure
and patterns of connections in the trade network, shock absorbers are also important. Indeed, the
developmental state helps to mitigate the effects of a crisis with its strong state capacity and political
will. To some extent, state capacity pertaining to government effectiveness in the civil service may
also moderate a crisis through efficiency in policy formulation and implementation. Overall, the
resulting impact of an economic crisis depends on the complex interplay between shock amplifiers
and absorbers.
The bullwhip effect is less evident when the government intervenes in the economy. Only in
cases where state capacity or intervention is very low does the bullwhip effect manifest. Indeed,
existing studies that neglect political variables might have bias and inaccurate results. Future research
should thus investigate more on the role of the state and how government policies mitigate the
bullwhip effect.
While scholars in business management and economics have long studied supply chain shocks
and ways to strengthen the chain, international political economy scholars have yet to explore this
increasingly important branch of research. Given the fragmentation and dispersion of world trade,
economic shocks in one area of the world can easily affect another region due to interconnectedness
and clustering in the supply chain network. Moreover, the impact of shocks might be different
for intermediate and final goods. With increasing data availability, IPE scholars should pay more
attention to GVCs in order to better assess the global economy. In addition, with innovations in
social network analysis and agent-based modeling methods, researchers can use a wide variety of
tools to gauge trade and financial dynamics. Overall, research on GVCs by political scientists would
add more perspective and diversity to the existing scholarship.
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APPENDIX
Figure A.1: Thresholding for intermediate trade and out-degree distributions (2013)
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Figure A.2: Thresholding for final trade and out-degree distributions (2013)
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Figure A.3: Intermediate Trade Network 2013
85
Figure A.4: Final Trade Network 2013
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Table A.1: Full TERGM Results for Intermediate and Final Networks (1996-2013)
Model 1 (2%) Model 2 (1%) Model 3 (2%) Model 4 (1%)
Crisis -0.410⇤ -0.463⇤ 0.181 0.487
[-1.140, -0.000] [-0.905, -0.024] [-3.668, 4.701] [-1.971, 3.757]
Developmental State x Crisis 0.023 0.004 -0.256 -0.132
[-0.158, 0.220] [-0.135, 0.193] [-0.476, 0.242] [-0.400, 0.533]
Government x Crisis -0.017 0.137 0.806 1.003
[-0.248, 0.164] [-0.208, 0.332] [-0.276, 1.638] [-0.076, 1.757]
Regulatory Quality x Crisis 0.128 0.020 0.045 0.015
[-0.092, 0.455] [-0.216, 0.283] [-1.220, 0.599] [-0.678, 0.475]
Transparency x Crisis -0.020 -0.062 0.729 -0.918
[-0.175, 0.109] [-0.149, 0.087] [-1.393, 0.332] [-1.582, 0.053]
Developmental State (Exporter) 0.369⇤ 0.543⇤ 0.067 0.118
[0.245, 0.495] [0.419, 0.695] [-0.140, 0.345] [-0.032, 0.326]
Developmental State (Importer) -0.720⇤ -0.689⇤ -0.938⇤ -0.899⇤
[-0.821, -0.614] [-0.775, -0.601] [-1.289, -0.548] [-1.487, -0.374]
Government -0.002 0.039 -0.274 -0.022
[-0.119, 0.109] [-0.101, 0.173] [-0.937, 0.374] [-0.841, 0.337]
Regulatory Quality -0.106 -0.091 0.207 0.184
[-0.236, 0.024] [-0.244, 0.082] [-0.027, 0.481] [-0.105, 0.515]
Transparency 0.132 0.125⇤ -0.026 0.065
[-0.002, 0.271] [0.028, 0.239] [-0.491, 0.418] [-0.369, 0.504]
Democratic Dyad -0.002 -0.017⇤ -0.053⇤ -0.031⇤
[-0.011, 0.007] [-0.028, -0.009] [-0.083, -0.021] [-0.051, -0.012]
GDP 0.000⇤ 0.000⇤ 0.000⇤ 0.000⇤
[0.000, 0.000] [0.000, 0.000] [0.000, 0.000] [0.000, 0.000]
Trade Openness 0.001 0.001⇤ -0.001 -0.002
[-0.000, 0.002] [0.001, 0.002] [-0.003, 0.002] [-0.002, 0.002]
Lagged Export 3.288⇤ 3.029⇤ 2.340⇤ 2.188⇤
[3.090, 3.619] [2.849, 3.313] [2.030, 2.712] [1.923, 2.489]
Triadic Closure/Transitivity 0.446⇤ 0.456⇤ 0.552⇤ 0.758⇤
[0.354, 0.540] [0.299, 0.642] [0.407, 0.656] [0.306, 1.176]
in-2-star -0.952⇤ -1.070⇤ -5.306⇤ -5.901⇤
[-1.036, -0.878] [-1.200, -0.969] [-6.938, -4.567] [-7.469, -5.287]
out-2-star -0.255⇤ -0.505⇤ -0.151⇤ -0.161⇤
[-0.316, -0.204] [-0.580, -0.436] [-0.212, -0.073] [-0.225, -0.094]
m-2-star -0.014⇤ -0.013⇤ -0.017⇤ -0.018⇤
[-0.016, -0.012] [-0.016, -0.011] [-0.024, -0.007] [-0.028, -0.007]
in-degree 8.999⇤ 11.24⇤ 50.273⇤ 63.584⇤
[8.289, 9.833] [10.216, 12.624] [45.225, 70.381] [56.555, 81.044]
out-degree 3.306⇤ 6.083⇤ 2.111⇤ 2.288⇤
[2.875, 3.860] [5.379, 6.838] [1.369, 2.681] [1.606, 2.974]
Edges -32.438⇤ -47.665⇤ -137.410⇤ -179.760⇤
[-34.933, -30.609] [-51.785, -45.076] [-183.417, -118.202] [-229.139, -160.573]
⇤p<0.05. Models 1-4 show the TERGM estimates given in the columns with 95% confidence
intervals in the brackets. Confidence intervals not containing zero are statistically significant at
the 0.05 level. N = 59,508.
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Table A.2: Full TERGM Results for Intermediate and Final Networks (2007-08)
Model 5 (intermediate 2%) Model 6 (final 2%)
Developmental State (Exporter) 0.135⇤ -0.032
[0.090, 0.174] [-0.032, 0.506]
Developmental State (Importer) -0.563⇤ -0.798⇤
[-0.699, -0.471] [-9.388, -0.675]
Government 0.010 0.270⇤
[-0.021, 0.028] [0.270, 0.582]
Regulatory Quality 0.072 -0.179
[-0.070, 0.151] [-0.179, 0.701]
Transparency -0.014 -0.070
[-0.071, 0.089] [-0.368, 0.070]
Democratic Dyad -0.027⇤ 0.008
[-0.047, -0.010] [-0.010, 0.038]
GDP 0.000⇤ 0.000⇤
[0.000, 0.000] [0.000, 0.000]
Trade Openness 0.001⇤ -0.002⇤
[0.000, 0.001] [-0.009, -0.002]
Triadic Closure/Transitivity 0.604⇤ 0.509⇤
[0.484, 0.692] [0.045, 0.571]
in-2-star -0.748⇤ -8.449⇤
[-0.830, -0.729] [-73.647, -8.449]
out-2-star -0.317⇤ -0.085
[-0.343, -0.313] [-0.128, 0.011]
m-2-star -0.020⇤ -0.006⇤
[-0.021, -0.019] [-0.007, -0.001]
in-degree 7.121⇤ 78.241⇤
[6.804, 7.995] [78.241, 660.298]
out-degree 3.909⇤ 1.601⇤
[3.832, 4.080] [0.800, 2.114]
Edges -27.526⇤ -187.670⇤
[-28.986, -27.259] [-1488.760, -187.668]
⇤p<0.05. Models 5 & 6 show the TERGM estimates given in the columns with 95%
confidence intervals in the brackets. Confidence intervals not containing zero are statistically
significant at the 0.05 level. N = 6612. Note that some of the estimates are near or on the
confidence interval boundaries due to rounding off to 3 decimal places.
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Figure A.5: Goodness-of-Fit Plots for Intermediate Exports (1996-2013) at 2% threshold
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Figure A.6: Goodness-of-Fit Plots for Final Exports (1996-2013) at 2% threshold
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Figure A.7: Goodness-of-Fit Plots for Intermediate Exports (2007-08) at 2% threshold
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Figure A.8: Goodness-of-Fit Plots for Final Exports (2007-08) at 2% threshold
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Figure A.9: Intermediate and Final Exports (2%) ROC Plots (for each year from 1996-2013)
(a) Intermediate Exports ROC (Mean AUC = 0.9246985)
(b) Final Exports ROC (Mean AUC = 0.8726622)
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Figure A.10: Intermediate and Final Exports (2%) ROC Plots (for the two years of 2007-08)
(a) Intermediate Exports ROC (Mean AUC = 0.8390024)
(b) Final Exports ROC (Mean AUC = 0.873395)
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Figure A.11: Netlogo Intermediate Export Network (2%)
(a) Network (begin)
(b) Network (end): note that due to randomness introduced in the
resistant chance, the individual countries that are resistant here
may not be representative. The progression plot would be a more
accurate representation of the dynamics of crisis propagation and
outcome.
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Figure A.12: Netlogo Final Export Network (2%)
(a) Network (begin)
(b) Network (end): note that due to randomness introduced in the
resistant chance, the individual countries that are resistant here
may not be representative. The progression plot would be a more
accurate representation of the dynamics of crisis propagation and
outcome.
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